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WATER POLLUTION AND COMMERCIAL
FISHERMEN: APPLYING GENERAL
MARITIME LAW TO CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES TO FISHERIES IN OCEAN
AND COASTAL WATERS
JOSEPH J. KALOt
Although there is a high level of interest in the public at large for
maintaining pollution-free water resources, the interest of commercial
fishermen is more specfic. Because the economic survival of these indi-
viduals is directly linked to the quality of the waters in which theyfish,
the private damage remedy for injury caused by pollution is an impor-
tant right. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have circumscribed
that right byforeclosingfederal common law as a source of injunctive
relief or damages. Nonetheless, a close study of the scope and interrela-
tinsh4, of maritime law, state law, andfederal legislation leads Profes-
sor Kalo to contend thatfederal relief many not be totallyprecludedfor
commercialfshermen. "General maritime law" may stillprovide afed-
eral remedy for injuries suffered in state territorial waters by these
plaintiffs.
Over the past two decades the people of this country have expressed in-
creasing concern about the quality of the environment in which they live and
work. There has emerged a heightened awareness of the broad, insidious eco-
nomic and societal effects of various forms of industrial and chemical pollu-
tants. New environmental laws have been enacted1 and existing laws have
been amended and strengthened,2 giving greater weight to maintaining a pure
environment.3 Even as some of the political tides have shifted, the public con-
cern with protecting high environmental quality remains.
4
Cleaning the nation's waters and maintaining them in as pure a form as
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State University; J.D. 1968, University of Michigan.
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1. Eg., Air Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Air) Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(Supp. IV 1980); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1444 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2. Eg., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980) (originally enacted as Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (amended 1972 & 1977)).
3. 1 F. GRAD., TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.01[l]-[2] (1981).
4. See, e.g., CBS News/N.Y Times Poll, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1981, at 30, col. 1 (poll con-
ducted Sept. 22-27; 1981).
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possible have been high on the list of environmental priorities.5 The public
concern has obviously been one of health, safety, and perhaps, esthetics. For
the commercial fisherman and other watermen who harvest the sea the con-
cern is more immediate and economic. When water quality is threatened,
their livelihood is endangered.
When commercial watermen have found their sea harvest depleted be-
cause of oil and chemical pollution of fishing grounds, they often have filed
civil actions against the pollutors. 6 These actions, seeking injunctive relief or
damages or both, were predicated upon commercial fishermen and
shelfishermen having a legally cognizable economic interest in the preserva-
tion of the environmental quality of rivers, bays, estuaries, and ocean waters.
Frequently these actions, filed in the federal courts, sought relief on a variety
of statutory, common law, and maritime theories. The Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act7 (FWPCA), the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act8 (MPRSA), The River and Harbors Act of 1899, 9 the National Environ-
mental Policy Act,' 0 the fourth, ninth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution, federal common law and general maritime law of
nuisance, 1 and other sources were all used, often in a single multifaceted
complaint,' 2 in an attempt to abate sources of pollution and to recoup losses
resulting from a decline of catches.
Some of the theories upon which the commercial watermen have relied in
the past have now been foreclosed by recent federal court decisions,13 the most
significant of which are the 1981 United States Supreme Court decisions in
Milwaukee v. Illinois14 and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
5. See, e.g., id
6. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (suit by commercial
fishermen against oil companies for damages allegedly sustained as a result of an oil spill); Loui-
siana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981) (suit by commercial
fishermen to recover damages for closing of fishing grounds due to contamination by PCB after
collision of ships); Potomac River Ass'n v. Lundeberg Md. Seamanship School, Inc., 402 F. Supp.
344 (D. Md. 1975) (suit by citizens' action groups against federal government officials and a pri-
vate corporation to enjoin activities and use of permits and to recover damages arising out of
corporation's dredging operations along a navigable creek); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F.
Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973) (suit by commercial fishermen and businessmen seeking damages for oil
spill), af'dmem., 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977); see also Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223
N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943) (suit by fishery to recover damages for injury to business caused by
pollution of river by pulp plant).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
8. Id §§ 1401-1402, 1411-1421, 1441-1444.
9. Id §§ 401, 403-404, 406-409, 411-415, 418, 502, 549, 686-687.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347, 4361 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
II. See, e.g., National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.
1980), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clam-
mers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
12. See 453 U.S. at 5 n.6.
13. See, e.g., City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445
F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976), af'd
men. sub nom East End Yacht Club, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977).
14. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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Sea Clammers Association.15 With these decisions the Supreme Court has
eliminated federal common law as a basis for injunctive relief or private dam-
ages in water pollution cases. 16 Injunctive relief and a damage remedy are to
be found elsewhere. This elsewhere, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, is state
statutory and case law.
17
Despite the Supreme Court's treatment of federal common law, and even
in the absence of diversity of citizenship, the federal courts may not be com-
pletely closed to commercial fishermen whose fishing grounds are damaged as
a result of pollution: they may be able to bring damage suits under general
maritime law or other federal statutes.' 8 This article will address four related
questions: (1) whether commerical fishermen and shellfishermen have a right
under general maritime law to recover damages when fishing and shellfishing
grounds are polluted; (2) whether any such rights under general maritime law
have been displaced by congressional legislation directing the application of
state law to such claims; (3) in the absence of any express congressional direc-
tive, whether and under what circumstances both state law and general mari-
time law can be applied concurrently to these claims; and (4) whether state law
may create damage claims for other persons who suffer some economic injury
as a result of water pollution, but whose claims are not recognized by maritime
law, when awards of damages to them may indirectly impair the rights of com-
mercial fishermen and shellfishermen.
I. AN OVERVIEW
Federal admiralty jurisdiction exists if pollution activities constitute a
maritime tort.19 If a maritime tort is committed, then general federal maritime
law-judicially created substantive law-may determine the nature and the
extent of the rights and remedies available to commercial fishermen in water
pollution cases.20 Not all maritime actions that may be brought in the federal
courts, however, are governed by general federal maritime law.21 The
15. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
16. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 317-19; National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 15-
22.
17. 451 U.S. at 328-29; 453 U.S. at 20 n.31.
18. Congress has provided fishermen with both a federal statutory remedy and a fund out of
which damage claims can be paid for pollution of fishing grounds caused by oil spills resulting
from oil and gas development of the outer continental shelf. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1866 (Supp. IV 1980). Subchapter I of the Act estab-
lishes an Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824. Although double
recovery is precluded by 43 U.S.C. § 1820, injured parties have the option of seeking recovery
under other federal or state laws rather than pursuant to this legislation. See 43 U.S.C. § 1820(a).
19. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253, 268 (1972) (fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction exists over aviation tort claims only when there is a significant relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity).
20. See, e.g., National Sea ClammersAss'n, 616 F.2d at 1236, rev'don other grounds, 453 U.S.
1 (1981); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 560-63 (9th Cir. 1974).
21. See, e.g., Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Wilburn Boat Co. it. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941); see also G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 1-17 (2d ed. 1975). The terms "territorial waters" and "terri-
torial seas" are used for convenience and are not intended to exclude inland waters. The argu-
ments presented are applicable to all navigable waters within the jurisdiction of federal admiralty
19831
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Supreme Court has held that in some cases, particularly those arising in state
territorial waters, state law may be applicable.22 In the absence of a congres-
sional directive to apply either maritime law or state law, the initial choice
depends upon whether a uniform rule establishing a minimal level of protec-
tion is considered necessary or whether the matter may be left to the possibly
varying rules of the states in whose waters the incidents occur.23 Thus, the
first issue addressed by this article is whether water pollution that interferes
with the activities of commercial fishermen constitutes a maritime tort; the
second is whether, in the absence of congressional commands, the rights of
commercial fishermen are founded in general maritime law or state law. De-
spite some indications to the contrary,24 an argument can be made that such
pollution does constitute a maritime tort, the legal consequences of which are
determined by general maritime law in the absence of a federal statute dictat-
ing a different result.25
The third issue is whether any federal statute displaces general maritime
law and calls for the application of state law in private damage actions
brought by commercial fishermen for pollution occurring in state territorial
waters. Some cases suggest that either the Submerged Lands Act of 195326 or
the FWPCA27 would require the application of state law rather than maritime
law. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 appears not to mandate the applica-
tion of state law to private claims for pollution of fisheries, but only to permit
the states to impose reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation measures
upon fisheries within state territorial waters. The effect of the FWPCA is more
difficult to evaluate, but it likewise does not appear to require the application
of state law. Evaluation of the effect of the FWPCA necessitates consideration
of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Association. These cases, which interpreted the FWPCA and
MPRSA, did not discuss whether private parties relying upon general mari-
time law may recover damages for pollution of fishing grounds, but did hold
that federal common law no longer provides the basis for a private action
courts. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Witshorek, 411 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. I11. 1976) (general maritime claim
for wrongful death applies to deaths on inland waters).
22. E.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Just v. Cham-
bers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941).
23. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1917).
24. E.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 332-34 & n.5 (1973).
The district court in Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 249, stated that there was no established federal
admiralty rule governing such torts but that admiralty jurisdiction did exist. The court side-
stepped the question whether state law provided the governing rules in the absence of an estab-
lished admiralty rule, see, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955),
or whether the federal court should create a uniform maritime rule, see, e.g., Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
25. See In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 334, 339-45 (2d Cir. 1981) (United States
sought recovery under maritime law for cleanup costs of oil spill in St. Lawrence River; claim for
cleaning Canadian waters was permitted, even though claim for cleaning United States waters was
denied on grounds of preemption by FWPCA).
26. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431
U.S. 265, 283-84 (1976); infra text accompanying notes 129-42.
27. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981); National Sea Clammers,4ss'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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seeking injunctive relief or damages in water pollution cases.28 Because gen-
eral maritime law is merely another species of federal common law,29 the
question naturally arises as to the effect, if any, of these two decisions upon the
continued availability of private damage remedies based upon general mari-
time law. This discussion will show why private rights of action based upon
general maritime law are distinguishable from the federal common law rights
dealt with in Milwaukee v. Illinois and National Sea Clammers Association, are
compatible with those decisions, and are consistent with the legislative intent
and statutory language of the FWPCA and MPRSA.
Regarding the fourth and final issue, the Supreme Court has held that in
some circumstances state law may be applied concurrently with federal mari-
time law to the same set of facts.30 Until recently, the federal courts did not
have to decide under which circumstances state law would be applied concur-
rently with maritime law in water pollution cases. In most of the water pollu-
tion cases involving maritime torts, the courts have assumed that state law and
maritime law were identical in all significant aspects and, therefore, the result
would be the same whichever was applied.31 Hard choices and hard decisions
were thus avoided. The continuing litigation in the Kepone case-Pruitt v.
Allied Chemical Corporation-however, clearly points out the need for decid-
ing when state law may apply concurrently with general maritime law.
32
In Pruitt the district judge held that commercial fishermen and
shellfishermen were entitled to recover under general maritime law for eco-
nomic damages resulting from the Kepone pollution to the James River and
Chesapeake Bay, but that boat marina and bait and tackle shop owners who
lost profits as a result of the decline in sportsfishing could not recover under
general maritime law.33 The damages suffered by the marina owners and bait
and tackle shop operators resulted from the interference with their contractual
relationships with sportsfishermen, a group that was directly injured by the
defendant's actions. This damage was a type of indirect economic harm not
compensable in maritime law.34 The court went on to hold that the marina
owners and boat and tackle shop operators could recover the same damages
28. 451 U.S. at 317-19; 453 U.S. at 21-22.
29. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61, 377 (1959); In re
Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d at 333-34; M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 97 (1980).
30. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Hess v. United
States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
31. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
32. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981). For sixteen months beginning in 1974, Life Science
Products Co. mixed and processed the highly toxic chemical Kepone and sold the product to
Allied Chemical Co. Large quantities of the toxic waste were dumped in the city of Hopewell's
sewage treatment system and eventually ended up in the James River. Large numbers of fish were
contaminated in an area reaching far into Chesapeake Bay. Some of the species of fish and shell-
fish affected by the pollution were migratory. Consequently, traces of Kepone were found in
bluefish caught off the New Jersey coast. See Spread of a Deadly Chemical-and the Ever Widen-
ing Impact, 81 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 16, 1976, at 43-44; Tragedy in Hopewell, 107
TIME, Feb. 2, 1976, at 43; Update, 89 NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1977, at 12.
33. 523 F. Supp. at 981-82.
34. Id
1983]
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under state law.35
If the district court in the Pruitt case correctly applied state law to a mari-
time tort, the damage remedy provided by general maritime law for com-
mercial fishermen and shellfishermen may be a hollow one in a mass water
pollution case. Mass water pollution activities may cause tremendous eco-
nomic damages. Yet, the defendant's assets, notwithstanding insurance, may
be insufficient to compensate all who suffer some form of economic injury.
The difficulty is then one of dividing available assets among potential claim-
ants. By recognizing a state cause of action for a group not entitled to recover
under general maritime law, the practical ability of commercial fishermen to
receive full compensation may be seriously impaired. Thus, the final question
addressed by this article is the extent to which state law may be applied to
permit recovery by groups suffering indirect economic damages not compensa-
ble under general maritime law. State law, it appears, may increase, but not
diminish, the protection afforded commercial fishermen by general maritime
law; therefore, state law that creates a cause of action for groups not having
cognizable rights under maritime law has the effect of impairing the rights of
commercial fishermen and is unconstitutional under the admiralty clause.
3 6
II. WATER POLLUTION AS A MARITIME TORT
The threshold question in allowing recovery is whether a particular act of
water pollution constitutes a "maritime tort." Such a classification has two
important legal consequences, one of which is jurisdictional, the other substan-
tive. First, the admiralty clause of article III of the United States Constitu-
tion,37 and the implementing legislation, 28 U.S.C. section 1333,38 grant the
federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters,
a part of which is maritime torts. Therefore, if pollution is a "maritime tort,"
plaintiffs may bring suit in a federal district court even in the absence of diver-
sity or the existence of any federal statutory cause of action. Second, as a
general rule, federal maritime law, not state law, determines the legal conse-
quences of a maritime tort.39 Since most maritime claims, just as many other
federal claims, may be filed at the plaintiff's option in either a federal court or
35. Id
36. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
37. Id
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976) provides, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (I) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." This provi-
sion, which has its origins in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76, permits a p laintiff
who holds an in personam claim, as opposed to an in rem claim, to bring suit, at his election, in a
"common-law" court. See generally The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867) (distinction
between in personam and in rem claims). If diversity jurisdiction exists and the requisite jurisdic-
tional amount is alleged, the action may be filed in the federal district court; otherwise, it must be
filed in the state court. Since a jury is not generally available in an admiralty proceeding, the
principal advantage to plaintiff is the availability of a jury trial in a "common-law" court. See,
e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
39. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Kermarec v. Compagnie




state court, classification of pollution as a maritime tort naturally means that,
regardless of the forum in which the claim is in fact heard, federal maritime
law, not state law, generally will determine the outcome. The term "maritime
tort" is thus a term of art defined by the tort jurisdiction granted by the admi-
ralty clause.
Admiralty tort jurisdiction concepts, however, have not remained static
over the years. Much like the sands of the barrier islands, the contours of
admiralty tort jurisdiction have been altered by shifting tides. Changes in ju-
dicial interpretation of the admiralty clause40 and congressional actions4 ' have
been part of this process. Prior to 1972, any injuries occurring on or in naviga-
ble waters as a result of oil, chemical, or other forms of pollution was maritime
torts even if the source or origination of the pollution was some land based
activity.42 The jurisdictional analysis proceeded in two steps. First, the courts
held that the locus of the tort was not where the negligent act resulting in the
discharge of pollutants occurred, but where the injury took place.43 Next, by
applying the then accepted locality test,44 the courts held that if the injury
occurred in navigable waters, admiralty jurisdiction existed.4 5 Thus, the loca-
tion of the source of pollution was irrelevant. Pollution that originated on
land but found its way into navigable waters and caused injury there was
40. For the development of admiralty jurisdiction over torts occurring on inland waters, see
The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (jurisdiction limited to tidal waters); The
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) (jurisdiction extended to Great Lakes
and other navigable waters); Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972)
(limiting admiralty jurisdiction over torts to those occurring on navigable waters and having a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activities).
Prior to 1948, damage to the shoreline, piers, or other structures that were considered exten-
sions of land fell outside admiralty jurisdiction. These injuries occurred on land, thereby failing
the "locality" test. Some of these claims were brought within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
federal courts as a result of the passage of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act, Pub. L. No.
695, 62 Stat. 496 (1948) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976)). After 1948, if a vessel was the source
or cause of pollution that caused damage to land structures, the action was within admiralty juris-
diction; if the pollution originated on land, however, and then flowed through navigable waters to
cause injury to the shore or land structures, the cause still was not cognizable in admiralty. See,
eg., United States v. Matson Nav. Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953).
41. Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976); Ship Mortgage Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 911, 921-927, 941, 951-954, 961, 971-975, 981-984 (1976, Supp. III 1979 & Supp. IV
1980); see also supra note 40.
42. In Maier v. Publicker Commerical Alcohol Co., 62 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1945), a 'dper
curiam, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946), defendant discharged grain residue into a sewer that flowed
into the Delaware River. The residue filled the holds of two partially submerged vessels plaintiff
was attempting to raise from the river. Plaintiff sued to recover the additional costs of removing
the residue and raising the vessels. The district court held that the claim was cognizable in admi-
ralty and allowed recovery on a public nuisance theory. See also Maryland Dep't of Natural
Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (D. Md. 1972); The America, 34 F.
Supp. 855 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); cf. Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201 (6th Cir.) (loss of barge due to signals
made with automobile horn during fog), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 751 (1933).
43. Cf In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.) (decided after Executive Jet;
claim that smoke emitted by papermill unreasonably interfered with vessel's use of waterway),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974).
44. Under the locality test, "[elvery species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board
a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." The Plym-
outh, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1866); see also Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205
(1971).
45. Eg., Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. at 1063-65; The America, 34 F. Supp. 855
(E.D.N.Y. 1940).
19831
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treated for jurisdictional purposes in the same manner as pollution that
originated on the waters themselves.
46
The determination of the existence of admiralty tort jurisdiction became
more complex in 1972 after the Supreme Court's decision in Executive JetAvi-
at/on, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, which discarded the locality test as the appro-
priate measure and adopted instead a "locality plus" test.47 Executive Jet
itself involved the crash into Lake Erie of a small jet when its power failed
during takeoff from Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland. 48 Admiralty juris-
diction did not exist over the tort claims arising out of the crash because:
the mere fact that the alleged wrong "occurs" or "is located" on or
over navigable waters. . . is not of itself sufficient to turn. . . [the
alleged wrong] into a "maritime tort." It is far more consistent with
history and the purpose of admiralty to require also that the wrong
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity
49
Although the holding was limited to its facts-that there was "no federal ad-
miralty jurisdiction over aviation torts arising from flights by land based air-
craft between points within the continental United States" 50 -and the
Supreme Court has never held that the Executive Jet test applies to all torts
occurring on navigable waters, 51 all lower courts and commentators have since
concluded that a tort now must have both a maritime locale and a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity before admiralty jurisdiction
exists.
52
Application of the Executive Jet test will remove from admiralty jurisdic-
tion some water pollution cases that would have satisfied the locality test,53 but
it should not affect jurisdiction over cases involving claims by commercial
46. In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974).
47. 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
48. Id at 250.
49. Id at 268.
50. Id at 274.
51. In its most recent pronouncement on admiralty tort jurisdiction, the Court stated that
"the Executive Jet requirement that the wrong have a significant connection with traditional mari-
time activity is not limited to the aviation context." Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct.
2654, 2658 (1982). The court, however, did not say that the Executive Jet test applied to all torts
having a maritime locale.
52. See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528
F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975); Jigg III Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); In re Motor Ship Pac. Carrier, 489 F.2d 152 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974); Kayfetz v. Walker, 404 F. Supp. 75 (D. Conn. 1975).
53. An example is a case in which sewage dumped into a navigable river makes swimming
facilities unusable, causing injury to the owners. The situs requirement is met, but "swimming" is
not a traditional maritime activity. See, e.g., Chapman v. City of Gross Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d
962 (6th Cir. 1967); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 871-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). In
addition, the pollution source is nonmaritime. Thus, neither the activities of the injured parties
nor those of the injuring parties satisfies the second jurisdictional criterion. Cf. Crosson v. Vance,
484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973) (admiralty jurisdiction does not reach personal injury claim by a
water skier arising out of negligent operation of towboat); Pfeiffer v. Weiland, 226 N.W.2d 218
(Iowa 1975) (cause of action not cognizable in admiralty because water skier and boat operator
engaged in a strictly recreational activity having no relationship with, and presenting no danger
to, traditional maritime commerce).
[Vol. 61
POLL UTION AND FISHERMEN
fishermen and shellfishermen.5 4 Both jurisdictional requirements set forth in
Executive Jet are met in these cases. When pollution enters navigable waters
and destroys the marine life or environment, the situs requirement is satisfied.
The activity requirement can be satisfied by either the activity of the person
claiming the injury or the person causing it.s5 Thus, the fact that the source of
pollution is nonmaritime does not remove the case from admiralty jurisdiction
so long as the effect of the pollution is to interfere with a traditional maritime
activity, some of the oldest of which are fishing, shellfishing, and oystering.
5 6
4. Water Pollution: A Maritime Tort Governed by General Maritime Law
The existence of a "maritime tort" which gives rise to admiralty jurisdic-
tion is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the application of federal
maritime law. The general rule has been that maritime law governs all mari-
time tort cases. Unfortunately, the matter does not end there. The fact of the
matter is that maritime law is not a comprehensive body of substantive law,
and in territorial and inland waters, state law and maritime law stand in an
uneasy coexistence.
The Supreme Court cases describing the relationship between maritime
law and state law are bewildering.5 7 The landlubber who walks this deck
quickly becomes seasick; the mariner's walk and stomach may not be so trou-
bled. It is not that the mariner is able to see what is hidden from the landlub-
ber's eyes; he is simply accustomed to the wild pitching and yawing of the
ship. In some instances state law has been applied to fill the "gap" in maritime
law;5 8 in other instances, even in the absence of a general maritime rule, article
III has been interpreted as precluding the application of state law.5 9 Other
54. See, e.g., National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1235-36 (3d
Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). But see Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n,
557 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978) (pollution of oyster beds under
lease from state not related to maritime aspects of oystering industry).
55. The district court in Potomac River Ass'n v. Lundeberg Md. Seamanship School, Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 344, 358 (D. Md. 1975) stated that "interpretation of Execudve Jet indicates that the
activity of the one injured, rather than the one injuring, must have a maritime nexus."
That interpretation, however, seems incorrect. Referring to the "swimming" example, see
supra note 53, if a ship is the source of the pollution but the persons injured were not engaged in
traditional maritime activity, the claim should still be cognizable in admiralty. The test for juris-
diction should be satisfied whether the traditional maritime activity is the source of the injury or
the subject of it, since the wrong bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity in
either case.
56. See, e.g., National Sea ClammersAss'n, 616 F.2d at 1235-36; Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1974).
57. The title of Professor David Currie's lengthy article on the relationship between maritime
law and state law describes the area well. Currie, Federalism andtheAdriraft, "Yhe Devil's Own
Mess," 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 158; see also M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 101-05; Stolz, Pleasure
Boating andAdamiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALi. L. Rnv. 661 (1963).
58. See, e.g., The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); see also Currie, supra note 57, at 167-68;
Stolz, supra note 57, at 701. State law may also supplement maritime law. See, e.g., Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 338-40 (1973); Kelly v. Washington ex rel
Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
59. See, ag., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
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cases further chum the waters. In some the Court has held that state law may
modify or change maritime law;60 in others, that a general maritime rule dis-
places state law.
6'
At the risk of oversimplification, there seem to be three modern general
principles controlling the determination whether state law or maritime law or
both govern a maritime transaction or event. First, since maritime law is not a
comprehensive body of law, the court must initially determine whether there is
in fact an applicable preexisting general maritime rule.62 If there is not, the
court must decide whether the federal maritime interest mandates the formu-
lation of a general maritime rule or whether the particular matter may safely
be left to the varying rules of the states in which the question arises.63 Second,
Congress has the power under the admiralty clause and the necessary and
proper clause to require by legislation that state law be applied to maritime
matters. 64 Thus, any statute relating to the matter must be examined to deter-
60. See, eg., Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941); The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98
(S.D.N.Y. 1893), modfled on other grounds sub nom. McCullough v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
61 F. 364 (2d Cir. 1894), appeal dismissedper sipulation, 163 U.S. 693 (1895). But see Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), which
had held that general maritime law did not provide recovery for wrongful death; state's wrongful
death statute did not allow recovery for death in state territorial waters caused by
unseaworthiness).
61. See, eg., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893); The Orle-
ans, 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 175 (1837); The Planter, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833); f Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 442 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1971) (general maritime law controlled
action by railroad brakeman injured in fall from boxcar, where boxcar was aboard vessel in navi-
gable waters), affdper cur/am, 406 U.S. 340 (1972).
62. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
63. Id at 316; see also infra note 64.
64. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 (1959); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932). The exact extent of the congressional power is unclear. See M.
REDISH, supra note 29; Currie, supra note 57.
There is strong authority for the argument that state law cannot displace or modify maritime
law. The argument begins with the admiralty clause, one purpose of which, according to the
Court, is the application of a uniform body of law to maritime matters, thereby not allowing the
rights of parties to shift from state to state. The Court occasionally has taken the position that the
admiralty clause does not permit, even with congressional authorization, the application of state
law to maritime matters when the effect would be the displacement or modification of general
maritime law. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 158-59 (1920). The leading case
for this proposition is Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), which was one in a series
of Supreme Court cases discussing the application of state workmen's compensation laws to long-
shoremen and harbor workers. In Jensen the widow of a harbor worker (killed while unloading a
ship) received an award under the New York Workers' Compensation Act. The Court set aside
the award, holding that application of the New York statute to maritime workers was unconstitu-
tional under article III. The Court reasoned that if states could each apply their own workmen's
compensation acts to maritime workers the "necessary consequences would be destruction of the
very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to establish."
Id at 217.
Congress then passed an amendment to the Judiciary Act of 1789, the intent of which was to
permit the states to apply their own workmen's compensation acts to maritime workers. Act of
Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395. The congressional power to enact such legislation was predicated
upon article III and the necessary and proper clause of article I. These two provisions had been
interpreted as vesting in Congress legislative authority over admiralty matters. See Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). In Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920), the ex-
pected challenge to that legislation occurred. Once again a widow of a maritime worker sued and
received an award under the New York Workers' Compensation Act. The Court held that Con-
gress had the power to legislate over admiralty matters, but that the amendment to the Judiciary
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mine whether Congress has in fact mandated the application of state law.
Third, even when a general maritime rule exists, state law may still be applied
when it provides additional protection to the maritime interest, but not when
the effect of application of state law would be to decrease the protection al-
ready afforded by general maritime law.65 This section and the next two sec-
tions of this article examine the operation of these principles in the context of
pollution of fisheries in state territorial waters.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts have provided a
clear holding that commercial fishermen have a right under general maritime
law to recover damages for pollution to fisheries. Yet it seems clear that such a
right exists. The admiralty clause of article III does evidence a general federal
Act was an unauthorized delegation of power to the states and ran afoul of the uniformity require-
ment of the admiralty clause. Ultimately, the particular issue was resolved by the passage of the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, 947-950 (1976)), but the limitations on both state and congressional
power linger on. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 344 (1973); G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21; M. RDISH, supra note 29.
The Supreme Court retreated from the absolutist position that even Congress cannot author-
ize the application of state law to maritime matters. In Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321 n.29 (1955) the Court disposed of such an argument: "It is faintly con-
tended that the Federal Constitution forbids States to regulate marine insurance, even where Con-
gress acquiesces or expressly consents. This contention is so lacking in merit that it need not be
discussed." This interpretation of article III is more palatable than the extreme uniformity posi-
tion expressed in Jensen. Congress is certainly capable of determining whether the federal interest
in maritime matters requires a uniform body of laws, or whether the matter may be safely en-
trusted to the states. The Court's role should be the more limited one of determining whether in
the absence of any congressional enactment a particular issue is controlled by state or federal
maritime law.
The present status of the Jensen-Knickerbocker line of cases is unclear. In Askew, one issue
was whether state water pollution controls imposing, among other things, strict liability upon ves-
sels and other facilities for sea-to-shore pollution infringed upon the uniformity requirement of
article III. When the relationship between state law and the admiralty clause was discussed, the
Court focused upon oil pollution damages to the shore or shore facilities. Since the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 102(O)(2), 84 Stat. 91, 97 (amended 1972), a
predecessor of the FWPCA, stated that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as preempting
any State ... from imposing any requirement or liability with respect to the discharge of oil into
any waters within such State," the issue was whether, despite this waiver of preemption, the Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976), which brought ship-to-shore injuries
within the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction, precluded the application of state law to such
injuries. Prior to the passage of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act, regulation of such
injuries clearly was within the police power of the state. The Act itself did not purport to remove
this area from state control; its purpose was to expand the judicial power of the federal admiralty
courts. Therefore, the Court stated that the states retained the power to legislate on these matters
unless the Jensen line of cases had to be interpreted as requiring preemption of these historic
powers of the states. The Court held that such an interpretation was not appropriate. 411 U.S. at
337-40, 344.
. InAskew the Jensen line of cases was limited. According to the Court, "Jensen and Knicker-
bocker lce have been confined to their facts, viz., to suits relating to the relationship of vessels,
plying the high seas and our navigable waters." Id at 344. Although the Court had discussed
shore-to-sea and sea-to-sea pollution injuries, the last paragraph of the opinion appeared to limit
the holding and the downgrading of Jensen: "Jensen thus has vitality left. But we decline to move
the Jensen line of cases shoreward to oust state law from situations involving shoreside injuries by
ships on navigable waters." Id Thus, the status of Jensen and the line of "shore-to-sea" and
"sea-to-sea" pollution cases was left unresolved. The law to be applied in such cases depends
upon an examination of potentially applicable statutes and, in the absence of any such statutes,
upon the effects of the skeletal remains of Jensen.
65. See Currie, supra note 57, at 219-20; M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 101, 102 n.181.
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interest in the promotion of maritime activities,66 activities upon which this
country was highly dependent at the time the Constitution was adopted. 67 Pro-
tection of that interest envisioned both the availability of a federal forum and
the development of a body of maritime law where necessary. 68 Although the
federal interest is occasionally viewed as being one in maritime commerce and
limited to the transportation of goods by sea,69 the transportation of goods was
not the only maritime activity upon which this country relied in its early days.
Fishing was a major commercial activity in the colonial period and remains so
today.70 Within the last decade, the health of the industry has been the subject
of substantial congressional concern and legislation. 71
International ramifications of an important water based activity and a
need for uniformity of law, two additional underpinnings of the admiralty
clause, apply as readily to fishing activities as to other traditional maritime
activities. Some aspects of the fishing industry, even in territorial waters, may
have international implications.72 Potential exclusion of foreigners from rich
fishing grounds, catch limitations, and gear conflicts are among such consider-
ations. Fishing also often involves constant movement between imaginary
boundaries of various states. To have the rights of those engaged in the indus-
try subject to change by crossing an imaginary line on a body of water while in
the pursuit of migratory fish hardly makes sense.73 Finally, the cases support
an interpretation of article III that logically extends jurisdiction to interference
66. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, § 1-10; M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 97-108;
THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (A. Hamilton).
67. See H. INNIS, THE COD FISHERIES: THE HISTORY OF AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 224
(1940) (over the period 1789-1818 exports of dried cod alone were worth $49,000,000).
68. See id at 220 & n.18 (the difficulty of securing united action in the face of trade retalia-
tion by England after the Revolutionary War contributed to the movement for the adoption of the
Constitution; in addition, Jefferson issued a report on the importance of fisheries to the economy);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 11 (A. Hamilton); id No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961).
69. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, §§ 1-5 to -6.
70. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 761 (1965) (abstracting from 3 D. MACPHERSON, ANNALS OF
COMMERCE, MANUFACTURES, FISHERIES, AND NAVIGATION (London 1805)) (dried fish weighing
73,920,336 lbs. and worth 375,394 pounds sterling was exported from colonial America in 1770);
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FISHERY STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1976, at 1 (1980) (com-
mercial landings in the United States in 1976 totaled 5.4 billion lbs. with a value of $1.3 billion,
while United States flag vessels also landed tuna and shrimp valued at $65.1 million at ports
outside of the United States).
71. See, eg., Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (fisheries conservation zone of the United States extended to 200 nautical
miles); H.R. REp. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 593, 593 (purpose of Fisheries Conservation and Management Act is to provide for the
protection, conservation, and enhancement of the fisheries resources of the United States). Con-
cern about the potential economic impact of outer continental shelf oil spills upon fishermen was
one of the factors that led to the establishment of an Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824 (Supp. IV 1980). Subchapter II of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments of 1978 established a Fishermen's Contingency Fund, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1847
(Supp. IV 1980), to provide compensation for damages to fishing gear and any resulting economic
loss to commercial fishermen due to activities related to oil and gas development.
72. Cf. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (federally licensed vessels
owned by noncitizens were denied their federally granted right to fish in Virginia on same terms
as state residents by a state law prohibiting them from fishing anywhere in Virginia).
73. Id at 285-86.
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with fishing and shellfishing activities. 74 For example, accidents aboard com-
mercial, fishing, or recreational vessels involving seamen or passengers are
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.75 There is no reason
why interference with actual fishing operations, the main maritime purpose of
these vessels, also should not be within admiralty jurisdiction just as interfer-
ence with any other traditional maritime activity.
76
If we move away from the violent clashing of the waves of maritime law
against the shore of state law in the coastal waters, and into the more legally
tranquil ocean waters, the logic of this assertion becomes more apparent. As-
sume that chemical or oil spills from a tanker or other vessel seriously damage
rich ocean fishing grounds: would the Supreme Court hold that there was no
maritime tort and that maritime law did not govern the rights of the parties?
77
The lower courts have already held that pollution of territorial waters consti-
tutes a "maritime tort,"-it interferes with the rights of the maritime interests
to use the waters. 78 The same analysis would apply to ocean waters. The
tanker has the right to use the seas, but not to interfere unreasonably with the
coequal rights of other maritime users. If it does, then a maritime tort has
occurred. In the absence of a treaty or specific federal statute, what law would
a federal court apply in such an instance? If a court were to apply state law,
which state's law would govern? By legislation consistent with the constitu-
tion, states have the power to control activities within their territorial bounda-
ries, but state law does not operate extraterritorially. 79 If a right exists in the
74. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2658 (1982) (the Court recognized
commercial fishing as a traditional maritime activity); National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of
New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1980), rep'don other grounds sub nonL Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1974); Potomac River Ass'n v. Lundeberg Md. Seamanship School, Inc.,
402 F. Supp. 344, 358 (D. Md. 1975).
75. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615
(4th Cir. 1981). The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on admiralty jurisdiction
clearly supports this position. In Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982) the
Court upheld admiralty jurisdiction of a lawsuit in which recovery was sought for the death of a
passenger that occurred when two pleasure boats collided on a navigable river. The Court stated
that the primary focus of admiralty jurisdiction is the protection of maritime commerce, but that
this interest cannot be adequately protected if admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to those individu-
als actually engaged in commercial maritime activity. The federal interest can only be fully
served if all operators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to the same uniform rules of
conduct-namely, admiralty law. Id at 2659.
76. See infra note 74.
77. A specific statute dealing with liability for oil spills arising out of outer continental shelf
activities is 43 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1866 (Supp. IV 1980). Liability is limited, however. The only
activities covered are those associated with outer continental shelf oil drilling and transportation,
and the extent of liability is limited if recovery is sought under the Act. The legislative history
does not provide any meaningful discussion of the rights of fishermen to recover damages in the
absence of the Act.
78. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1974); Oppen v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973); Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp.
1170, 1174 (E.D. La. 1981); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 249 (D. Me. 1973), af'd
mem, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977).
79. Ocean waters are not within the legislative jurisdiction of the states, except when the state
is regulating the activities of its own citizens. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 76-79 (1941); see
Outer Continental Shelf Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1976); Marine Protection, Research and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1976).
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hypothetical, it is a right provided by maritime law, which the federal admi-
ralty courts sit to apply just as do the admiralty and maritime courts of other
nations.
When the pollution occurs in territorial seas or inland waters, the only
difference is that the incident has now occurred within the boundaries of some
state. The actors and the injury may remain the same. Does the difference in
location require the application of a different body of substantive law? Cer-
tainly the federal interest in protecting commercial fishermen from the eco-
nomic consequences of pollution remains the same. Merely because the
incident occurred within state territorial waters does not per se affect the
power of the court to apply general maritime law, if general maritime law
recognizes a right of recovery in such cases when they occur on ocean waters.
Certainly with respect to other maritime torts, the governing law does not
change depending upon whether the tort occurs in ocean waters or state terri-
torial waters. Collisions are governed by general maritime law wherever they
occur;80 personal injuries to crewmen or passengers aboard recreational or
commercial vessels are similarly treated.8' Thus, if the governing law is mari-
time when pollution of fisheries occurs outside state territorial waters, the gov-
erning law should be maritime when it occurs within state territorial waters.
B. The Maritime Torts of Private and Public Nuisance
Because the issue could be avoided in past cases, courts have not resolved
the question whether maritime law or state law or both concurrently govern
the rights of commercial fishermen in pollution cases. When the question has
arisen in private and public nuisance actions, courts have stated that the result
in the case would be the same whichever law was applied and, therefore, there
was no need to resolve the issue.82 In those cases the courts were correct: the
core principles governing maritime torts of private and public nuisance are the
same as the common law principles of private and public nuisance. Both the
common law and admiralty courts traditionally have permitted individuals to
recover damages in both public and private nuisance action when pollution
interferred with the use or enjoyment of their property or with some other
legally cognizable interest.
80. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. at 2660. Compare The Clara, 102 U.S. 200
(1880) with The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
81. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982); see also Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d
615 (4th Cir. 1981). Compare Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 .(1960) with Dixon v.
United States, 219 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1955) and Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 112 F. Supp. 177
(E.D. La. 1953), rev'd, 211 F.2d 618, rev'd, 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
82. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 562; Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d at
257-60; Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. at 249; Vf In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327,
334-43 (2d Cir. 1981) (although the court recognized the possibility that non-negligent conduct
amounting to a public nuisance could create liability under general maritime law, it held that the
government's remedies were limited to those specifically provided in the FWPCA). The district
court in Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Co., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) avoided making a choice by
applying both general maritime law and state law to the claims presented, and then allowing
recovery if either source of law makes relief available.
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1. Maritime Private Nuisance
If pollution causes a direct injury to or interference with real property,
then a private nuisance action can be brought in the common-law courts.
8 3
Likewise, when pollution causes injury to or interference with maritime prop-
erty, admiralty courts permit a private nuisance action.8 4 Maier v. Publicker
Commercial Alcohol Co. is an example of such a private nuisance action in
admiralty.85 In Maier defendant was manufacturing alcohol and allied chemi-
cal products near the shore of the Delaware River in Philadelphia. In 1942,
pursuant to a directive of the Office of Production Management of the War
Production Board, defendant substituted grain for molasses as the basic mate-
rial in alcohol production. Unfortunately, defendant was not able to obtain
the equipment necessary to process the residue, which was discharged into a
sewer that emptied into the river.86 Two hundred and fifty feet from the dis-
charge point of the sewer sat plaintiff's two partially submerged vessels. The
grain residue filled the vessels' holds, and plaintiff sued to recover the addi-
tional cost of removing the mash and raising the vessels. 87 The district court
permitted recovery on the theory that defendant's actions constituted a mari-
time tort, but did not decide whether the tort was governed by state law or
general maritime law. The court simply held that defendant breached a duty
to conduct the manufacturing process so as not to injure others and that the
failure to do so under the circumstances constituted a private nuisance.88
Mafier, however, was not a typical nuisance action. Defendant's activities
at the time did not pose any danger to the public health or interfere with the
public's ability to use the river. The residue, much like sand pouring out of a
pipe, filled plaintiffs vessels, injuring him but no others. By contrast, most
pollution of navigable waters would probably be regarded by the courts as
involving a public nuisance because the pollution would interfere with the in-
terests of the general public in clean, pure, and productive navigable waters. 89
83. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 88, at 586-91, § 89, at 591-93 (4th ed. 1971).
84. Id § 88, at 588; Burgess, 370 F. Supp. at 250; Maier v. Publicker Commercial Alcohol
Co., 62 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1945), a fdper curiam, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946). Courts sitting
in admiralty jurisdiction (as well as courts sitting in nonadmirality jurisdiction) occasionally and
mistakenly have held that a single act of pollution does not give rise to a nuisance claim: "a single
occurrence oil spill does not now and has never in the absence of legislation amounted to a com-
mon law nuisance." Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1060, 1069 (D. Md. 1972). Recovery in such cases has been permitted on the ground that the
single occurrence constituted a maritime tort of negligence. Id at 1070-71.
As Prosser points out, however, "nuisance is a field of tort liability, rather than a type of
tortious conduct." W. PROSSER, supra note 83, § 87, at 573. Negligence is one specific form of
conduct that can give rise to a nuisance, and a single, instantaneous negligent act can cause dam-
age so substantial as to amount to a nuisance. Ia § 87, at 574-75, 579-80.
In most cases the court's characterization of the theory of recovery will not affect the outcome
and, under the liberal pleading rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint that is
sufficient to plead negligence will also be sufficient to plead a private nuisance based upon that
same act. See, e.g., Mater v. Publicker CommericalAlcohol Co..
85. 62 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1945), a'dper curiam, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1946).
86. Id at 163.
87. Id at 164.
88. Id at 165.
89. See Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), af'dmem., 559 F.2d 1200
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2. Maritime Public Nuisance
When pollution has such a widespread impact, another principle basic to
cdmmon law is that a private party cannot recover damages unless the injury
he suffers is different in kind from that experienced by the rest of the general
public.90 A maritime public nuisance action brought by a private party con-
fronts the same limitation for precisely the same reasons as exist at common
law. When water pollution creates a public nuisance, a private party may not
sue for damages unless he can show that he suffered some damage different in
kind from that experienced by the public in general.91 Everyone's ability to
drink, swim in, boat upon, or otherwise use public waters is affected by water
pollution. If everyone were free to sue for his or her individual harm, the
courts and the defendants would be confronted with an administratively
crushing burden of litigation even with the present class action and collateral
estoppel rules.92 Individual damages would have to be assessed, even though
these individual losses, important though they may be, are typically small and
often difficult to measure in economic terms. 93 The most economic and ad-
ministratively efficient means of litigating public nuisance claims, whether
common law or maritime, is to leave the control of such litigation in the hands
of federal and state governmental authorities.94 In suits brought by these pub-
lic bodies, the damages to the water and marine life and the cost of cleaning
up the public waters may be recovered, thus adequately protecting the interest
of the average citizen. Only when a private citizen experiences some unique
injury not adequately protected or compensated by actions brought by govern-
mental bodies will an individual suit be both necessary and desirable.95
The claims of commercial fishermen and shellfishermen for interference
with their ability to harvest marine life in coastal waters generally fall into the
(1st Cir. 1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 83, § 88. The change in the theory of recovery does not
affect the right to recover of claimants similar to the plaintiff in Maler. Undoubtedly, plaintiff in
Maier could have obtained relief even if the pouring of grain residue into the river constituted a
health hazard and was therefore a public nuisance. The distinction between public and private
nuisance has more to do with litigation efficiency and the nature of plaintiffs interest than with
the substantive nature of defendant's actions.
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821C, comment h, illustration 11 (1979).
91. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. at 250.
92. See City of Evansville, Ind. v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979)
(in action to recover damages resulting from discharges of contaminants into river, adequacy of
enforcement schemes of Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899 and FWPCA precluded any inference that
a private cause of action existed), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Parsell v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.
Supp. 1275 (D. Conn. 1976) (in action for damages arising out of oil spill in harbor, court refused
to imply private cause of action under Rivers & Harbors Act), aj'dmem sub nom. East End Yacht
Club v. Shell Oil Co., 573 F.2d 1289 (1st Cir. 1977). In Township of Long Beach v. City of New
York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978) a township brought action under FWPCA, MPRSA, and
state and federal common law, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against New York City
and the Environmental Protection Agency and its administrator for dumping garbage in the Hud-
son River and the Atlantic Ocean. Although the court said the federal common law of nuisance
had not been preempted by the federal statutes in question, no implied cause of action existed
under the two federal statutes. Id at 1212, 1215.
93. See, e.g., Woods v. Rock Hill Fertilizer Co., 102 S.C. 442, 86 S.E. 817 (1915).
94. See Page v. Niagara Chem. Div., 68 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1953); Brown v. Florida Chautaugua
Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910); W. PROSSER, supra note 83, § 88, at 587 & n.68.
95. See supra note 78.
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category of unique injuries suffered by private individuals as the result of a
public nuisance.96 The leading case upholding the right of fishermen and
shellfishermen to recover damages in such cases is Burgess v. M1/V Tamano,
which involved a disastrous spill of 100,000 gallons of bunker oil by the tanker
M/V Tamano in July 1972 as it entered the harbor at Portland, Maine.97 The
spill caused enormous damage to the coastal waters and marine life and
spawned a number of public and private lawsuits, one of which was filed by
commercial fishermen and clam diggers as well as beach businessmen.98 The
fishermen and shellfishermen sought recovery for interference with their right
to fish and dig clams, which the court held was a special, legally protected
interest in the use of the coastal waters distinct from the interest of the general
public. Each commercial fisherman was making a direct commercial use of
the public waters, and to the extent they could prove economic losses, that
special use was compensable in a private damage action.99 The claims of
beach and town businessmen, however, for economic damage resulting from
the loss of customers who no longer frequented resort businesses in the area
was not an injury distinct from that suffered by the general public and, there-
fore, was not compensable.' °° The businessmen were not making any direct
or distinctive use of the public waters. Their injury, although different in de-
gree, was derivative of the right of the public in general and one common to
all businesses and residents of the beach area.
Some of the claims of the businessmen would be derivative of the claims
of recreational fishermen, and the damages experienced by recreational
fishermen also are not compensable. 10 1 Recreational fishermen may directly
use the public waters, but their use is available to any member of the general
public. If recreational fishing is destroyed by pollution, recreational fishermen
must look to the government for protection of their interests. Merely showing
the existence of a public nuisance and an injury different in degree from the
general public is not sufficient. The injury must be to a direct and distinctive
use of the public waters by the individual. 10 2 Thus, to the extent that any busi-
nessman's claim is derivative of the claims of recreational fishermen, it is like-
96. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Louisiana ex rel Guste v.
M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D.
Me. 1973), qfidmem., 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977); Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223
N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943).
97. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973), afl'dmenL, 559 F.2d 1200 (lst
Cir. 1977).
98. Id at 249.
99. Id at 250.
100. Id at 251.
101. See, e.g., Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Louisiana ex re. Guste v.
M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170 (E.D. La. 1981); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975
(E.D. Va. 1981); Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943).
102. The mere showing of a public nuisance and a unique injury is not a sufficient basis to
recover damages under the applicable law. The Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co. litigation, which arose out
of the infamous 1969 Santa Barbara oil disaster, illustrates this point. Oil escaped from the ocean
floor near a Union Oil Co. oil platform located off the coast of California. The resulting oil slick
permeated the waters of the Santa Barbara Channel and Harbor, rendering the channel and har-
bor temporarily unusable. After this incident the owners of numerous pleasure boats brought suit
against the oil company and its insurer to recover for physical damage to their boats due to con-
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wise not compensable. Other cases have adhered to the line drawn by
Burgess--commercial fishermen and shellfishermen are entitled to recover
provable economic damages in water pollution cases-but those who either do
not make direct use of the water for commercial purposes or whose use is not
significantly different from that of the public in general may not recover
damages.103
With such broad similarity between the common law and maritime law, it
is easy to see how the choice between the two is often avoided. But there are
areas of difference that may force the choice in the future. For example, at
common law, contributory negligence may be recognized as a complete de-
fense,104 but in maritime law it may not.'0 5 Other differences in available
defenses and legal standards also may exist.' 06 When one of these situations
tact with the oil slick and for interference with their navigation rights. Plaintiffs claimed that these
rights were protected under both maritime and state law. The court held:
Under federal maritime law loss of use of a private pleasure boat is not a compensable
item of damages. The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110 (1897). Aforior no cause of action
sounding in maritime tort can be maintained when the alleged injury is interference with
plaintiffs' use of their boats in the Santa Barbara Channel.
Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973). The court also disposed of plaintiffs'
contention that interference with their rights of navigation was compensable under California law
in a public nuisance action. Assuming that California law applied, the court held that the damage
suffered on account of plaintiffs' loss of navigation rights was no different from that experienced
by the public generally, and thus was not a recoverable item in a public nuisance action. Even in
the absence of -The Conqueror decision, presumably the court would have held that no one could
recover for interference with navigation rights without a showing that the interference with plain-
tiffs' rights resulted in an injury different from that suffered by the general public.
103. See, eg., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Oppen v. Aetna Ins,
Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F.2d 1170 (E.D.
La. 1981) (commercial fishermen, oystermen, and shrimpers can maintain suit; recreational
fishermen and owners of marinas, seafood restaurants, and other enterprises cannot); Pruitt v.
Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981) (but court did permit some business-
men who lost profits as a result of decline in sportfishing to recover under state law on "surrogate
plaintiff' theory); Potomac River Ass'n v. Lundeberg Md. Seamanship School, Inc., 402 F. Supp.
344 (D. Md. 1975); Vf Marine Navig. Sulphur Carriers, Inc. v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 638 F.2d 700
(4th Cir. 1981) (owner and charterer of vessel that struck a bridge not liable to various parties who
were temporarily unable to navigate the James River).
When economic losses are caused by an oil spill resulting from outer continental shelf activi-
ties, businessmen and others suffering the type of economic losses experienced in Burgess would
be able to receive compensation from the Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, See 43
U.S.C. § 1813 (Supp. IV 1980). The claims of the businessmen in Burgess would not be covered
because the vessel involved was not a source of damages that is covered by the Act. See 43 U.S.C.
1811(5), (15), 1813(a)(2).
104. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.1 (1974 & Supp. 1981) (38 states plus
the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico have adopted comparative negligence either by statute or
judicial action, thereby reducing the importance of contributory negligence in the United States).
105. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 104, § 3.3(B).
106. Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 618-21 (4th Cir. 1981) (maritime rule, which does not recog-
nize interspousal immunity, applied instead of Virginia common-law doctrine of spousal immu-
nity); Reichenbach v. Smith, 528 F.2d 1072, 1074 (5th Cir. 1976) (maritime rule regarding
admissibility of terms of settlement agreement applied instead of state rule); St. Hilaire Moye v.
Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 979-82 (8th Cir.) (mantime law applied instead of Arkansas guest stat-
ute), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974); Wolff v. Whittaker Marine & Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 1021,
1027 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (maritime doctrine of strict liability applied in products liability case arising
out of explosion of houseboat at a marina); Armour v. Gradler, 448 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1978)
(maritime doctrine of seaworthiness applied); Winter v. Eon Prod. Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 742, 746
(E.D. La. 1976) (maritime rule requiring apportionment of damages applied).
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arises, a choice will be required. Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corporation,10 7 to be
discussed later, poses another situation in which a choice is required. Of
course, the difficult choice may still be avoided if a federal statute were read to
require the application of state law instead of maritime law. Assuming that
Congress may authorize or acquiesce in the application of state law to mari-
time claims, the next inquiry is whether Congress has in fact done so with
respect to claims for interference with fisheries in territorial seas and inland
waters. Two congressional enactments-The Submerged Lands Act of
1953108 and the FWPCA-hint at such acquiescence or authorization. The
following will discuss these two acts and some of the cases interpreting them.
III. NEITHER THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT NOR FWPCA CAUSES
MARITIME LAW TO BE DISPLACED BY STATE LAW
A. Submerged Lands Act of 1953
The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 was passed in response to the United
States Supreme Court decision in United States v. California, which held that
the United States Government and not the State of California legally con-
trolled the submerged land underlying the territorial sea off the coastline of
California.10 9 Prior to that time the prevailing assumption was that the indi-
vidual states owned and had complete control over such lands and other re-
sources located in the territorial seas.110 The primary effect of the decision in
United States v. Calfornia was to withdraw oil deposits under the territorial
seas from state control, thereby depriving the states of a potential source of
revenue.11' As a result, a number of states' representatives urged Congress to
overturn the decision through legislation.' 12 Thus, the primary purpose of the
Act was to return the submerged lands and resources in the territorial seas to
the control of the individual coastal states.
In addition to the concern about the oil deposits, the legislative history of
the Act also evidences a belief that the decision called into question the contin-
ued validity of the states' historic power to regulate and manage fisheries in
state waters, even though the federal executive branch expressed no interest in
generally regulating and managing the fisheries.' 3 The lack of any general
federal interest in these fisheries and the failure of individual congressmen to
show that the federal government would more effectively manage these re-
107. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981): For a discussion of Pruitt, see infra notes 278-97 and
accompanying text.
108. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
109. 332 U.S. 19, 38-49 (1947).
110. H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 695, 82d Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1395, 1399.
111. H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-20 (1948).
112. Id at 2-3.
113. Id at 11, 21-22. "The attorneys general of several Great Lakes States. . . testified that
the California case was... a precedent which the Federal Government could properly urge in
any suit against the Great Lakes States to recover for the Federal Goverment the submerged areas
under the Lakes within the boundaries of such States." Id at 9.
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sources" 14 led Congress to the conclusion that the national interest would not
be served by transferring these powers to the federal government." 5 There-
fore, another objective of the Act was to assure that the management and regu-
lation of fisheries located in state territorial waters remained in the hands of
the individual states.11
6
Based upon this legislative history and some of the language of the Act
itself, a compelling argument can be made that free-swimming fish and shell-
fish located within state territorial waters are natural resources owned by the
state and, therefore, that state law defines both the conditions under which
such fish may be taken from the waters and the consequences of any interfer-
ence with an individual's right to take the fish. The Act, in part, provides:
It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that
(1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters
within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural re-
sources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and power to
manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said lands and natu-
ral resources all in accordance with applicable State law be, and they
are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, estab-
lished, and vested in and assigned to the respective States." 17
Natural resources are defined to include "fish, shrimp, oysters, clams, crabs,
lobsters, . . . and other marine animal and plant life.""I 8 Thus, the Act
speaks of state "ownership" of "natural resources," and fish are included
within the statutory definition of natural resources.
The argument for the application of state law is further buttressed by a
divided en banc 1976 decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a
somewhat unusual case, Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commis-
sion,1 9 the court used the Submerged Lands Act of 1953120 and two pre-Act
Supreme Court cases, which had discussed aspects of the states' power over
oystering, 2 as the basis for a decision that state law and not federal maritime
law governed a claim for damages caused by pollution of oyster beds. The
114. Id
115. Id at 22-23.
116. H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1948).
117. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
118. Id § 1301(e).
119. 557 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
120. Id at 1038 n.3.
121. d at 1038. The cases cited by the majority were Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
71 (1855) (Maryland statute regulating harvesting of oysters) and McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876) (Virginia statute regulating oyster cultivation in tidal rivers). According to the
Supreme Court in Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977), Smith Y. Maryland only
involved a decision that federal licenses were subject to a nondiscriminatory, reasonable state
conservation measure. Id at 277; see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 37 (1947). The
language in MCready, and presumably in Smith, that the states "owned" or had "title" to "the
fish swimming in their territorial waters" was relegated to the status of a 19th century legal fiction.
431 U.S. at 283-84. The Court observed that "under modem analysis, the question is simply
whether the state has exercised its police power in conformity with the federal laws and Constitu-
tion." Id at 284-85. This does not mean that McCready, Smith, or Moore were wrongly decided,
however. McCready and Smith may be read as recognizing the authority of the states to pass
valid conservation measures to which all who fish in state waters must adhere. See also Toomer v.
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oyster beds, leased from the State of Virginia, were destroyed as the result of
the allegedly negligent operation of a sewage disposal system by the City of
Newport News and the Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission. If
the court had concluded that the case was within admiralty jurisdiction and
that maritime law applied, the defense of sovereign immunity would not have
been available; if the court had concluded that there was no admiralty juris-
diction, the case would not only have been dismissed, but under state law any
claim might be met with the defense of sovereign immunity. 122 The court held
that damage to oyster leaseholds from sewage discharges by a municipality
was not related to the maritime aspects of the oystering industry and was
therefore outside admiralty jurisdiction and governed by state law.123 A simi-
lar argument may be made with respect to pollution of other types of fisheries
located in state territorial waters.
The force of this argument for application of state law to maritime tort
actions for pollution of fisheries in the territorial seas is blunted, however, by
other provisions of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, by the unique, distin-
guishable features of the Moore case, and by the tone and language of the
1977 United States Supreme Court decision in Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc. 124 Although the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 confirmed state authority
over submerged lands and other natural resources in the territorial seas, state
authority was still subject to limitations. The Act provided:
The United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights
in and powers of regulation and control of said land and navigable
waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, na-
tional defense, and international affairs, all of which shall be para-
mount to, but shall not be deemed to include, proprietary rights of
ownership, or the rights of management, administration, leasing, use,
and development of the lands and natural resources which are specif-
ically recognized, confirmed, established, and vested and assigned to
the respective States and others by section 1311 of this title.
125
The exact meaning of this passage for purposes of the application of federal
maritime law is not completely clear. The words "admiralty" or "maritime"
are not used in the retention clause. Instead, the clause refers to "commerce,
navigation. . . and international affairs," a trilogy that makes up a traditional
basis for admiralty jurisdiction. 126 Thus, the Act could be read as not in-
tending any displacement of traditional admiralty jurisdiction or general mari-
time law, thereby leaving claims for pollution to fisheries located within the
covered waters to be adjudicated in accordance with maritime law.
In addition, Moore is hardly clear authority for the proposition that Con-
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401 (1948). Moore only held that the consequences of interfering with state
leases of oyster beds should be determined by state law.
122. 557 F.2d at 1035, 1037.
123. Id at 1038-39.
124. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
126. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654,2658 (1982); M. REDISH, supra note
29, at 98; ef. Moore, 557 F.2d at 1034 n.7; id at 1036 (Field, J., dissenting).
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gress has authorized the application of state law to cases involving interference
with commercial fisheries. The case did not involve free-swimming or
migratory fish, but only a type of "mariculture" on submerged lands leased
from the state.127 Interference with the lessees of these state owned oyster
beds is distinguishable from the interference with the operations of fishermen
and shellfishermen who are pursuing and harvesting free-swimming and
migratory fish. The impact of the first type of interference is very localized,
whereas pollution of the second type may have an impact far beyond the wa-
ters into which the pollutants first spill and upon persons with a more remote
connection to the state itself. The Supreme Court has recognized certain mari-
time events or activities that have no significant implications beyond the par-
ticular place they occur as being suitable to control by the states.1 28 Therefore,
a holding that pollution of state owned oyster beds, leased to private parties, is
governed by state law does not foreclose the application of maritime law to
other types of fisheries. Furthermore, the state presumably could have re-
stricted plaintiffs' oystering operations on the tract leased and could have re-
quired that any claims be resolved according to state law. It is not inconsistent
with this consideration to hold that even in the absence of specific terms in the
lease, state law will determine the nature and extent of plaintiffs' rights in that
tract of submerged land.
The argument for exclusive state jurisdiction, however, is not as persua-
sive when pollution interferes with other commercial fishing activities, some of
which are not dependent upon a license or similar permission from the state in
whose water they are conducted. The 1977 decision in Douglas shows that the
state power with respect to federal licensees is more restricted than the state
power over oyster bed lessees, and may be limited with respect to even nonfed-
erally licensed fishermen. The less authority the state has over activities, the
less compelling the argument for the application of state law to pollution inter-
ference with them.
Douglas involved the validity of two Virginia statutes that limited the
right of nonresidents and aliens to catch fish in the territorial waters of the
state. 129 The appellant, Seacoast Products, Inc., a Delaware corporation, op-
erated a fleet of federally licensed menhaden fishing vessels in the Chesapeake
Bay and other eastern coastal waters. Under Virginia law the vessels owned
by Seacoast were not permitted to fish in that portion of the Chesapeake Bay
127. The Moore court relied upon McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876), but in Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1948), the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he McCready case related to fish which would remain in Virginia until removed by
man. The present case [Toomer] . . . deals with free-swimming fish which migrate
through the waters of several States ....
t . . [O]nly fifteen years after the McCready decision, a unanimous court indicated
that the rule of that case might not apply to free-swimming fish.
128. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-40 (1961); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 49-50.
129. 431 U.S. 265, 267-69 (1977).
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within Virginia. 130 One contention of Seacoast was that the Virginia statutes
were preempted by the federal enrollment and licensing laws for fishing ves-
sels. 131 Virginia contended that the federal license simply permitted the li-
censed vessel to navigate in state waters and that the ownership of fish and the
right to determine who could fish in those waters was vested in the states under
the Constitution and the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.132 The Court rejected
Virginia's contentions. 133 The state's assertion that it "owned" free-swimming
fish within its territorial waters was dismissed as "pure fantasy."'134 According
to the Court, the ownership language in its earlier opinions, 135 upon which the
Moore court had relied, 136 represented a legal fiction intended only to express
legal recognition of the states' power to "preserve and regulate the exploitation
of an important resource." 137 The powers that states possess to preserve and
regulate this resource remain limited by the powers retained by Congress in
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 and any other federal legislation or consti-
tutional provision. Since Congress had expressly retained its powers over
commerce, and since Congress has the authority under the commerce clause
both to pass legislation regulating the taking of fish in state waters and to
license vessels to fish in these waters, any state legislation discriminating
against federal licensees must fall. The state's power with respect to federal
licensees, therefore, is limited to the enactment and enforcement of "reason-
able and evenhanded conservation measures."'
138
The Douglas case did not mention the congressional powers under the
admiralty clause, and additional constitutional questions raised by the parties
were not addressed by the Court. 139 Nevertheless, the case has some bearing
upon the question whether state law displaces federal maritime law as the ap-
propriate body of substantive law governing the rights of commercial
fishermen in water pollution cases. First, the Court affirmed the position that
the Act did not pass to the states the power to govern all questions involving
fishing in state territorial and inland waters. Second, the Court emphasized
the fact that these commercial fishermen were pursuing free-swimming,
130. Id at 269-71.
131. Id at 271-72; 46 U.S.C. § 325 (Supp. IV 1980).
132. 431 U.S. at 280, 283.
133. Id at 281, 283.
134. Id at 284; see also id at 289-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 283 n.20, 285.
136. See supra note 121.
137. 431 U.S. at 284 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)). Toomer was before the
Court as Congress was debating the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. According to House Report
No. 1778, Toomer was viewed with alarm, as a "case pending in the Supreme Court in which
certain individuals are contending that under... [United States v. California! the state of South
Carolina has no power to regulate fishing off its coast and within the historic boundary of the
state." H.R. REP. No. 1778, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1948). If Congress' intent in passing the
Submerged Lands Act was to thwart that challenge, Congress was unsuccessful. In Toomer stat-
utes imposing higher licensing fees upon nonresidents and creating certain requirements that
shrimp be unloaded and packed in South Carolina were held unconstitutional. 334 U.S. 385, 403,
406 (1948). Toomer was reaffirmed in Douglas, 431 U.S. at 282.
138. 431 U.S. at 287.
139. Id at 271-72.
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migratory fish, with both the fishermen and fish moving "without regard for
state boundary lines."'140 State laws that unreasonably restricted these activi-
ties would invite similar retaliatory legislation by other coastal states, thereby
balkanizing the fishing industry. 14 1 To avoid this situation, the Court limited
the states' role to enactment and enforcement of conservation measures which
must of necessity vary depending upon the season, fish, waters, and other local
conditions. Implicit in this conclusion is the idea that some minimum uniform
rules govern the activities of fishermen regardless of which state's waters they
happen to fish. Third, unless the Court is willing to imply a private cause of
action from the licensing statutes, it would seem that the consequences of pol-
lution which interfere with fishing rights granted by federal licensing statutes
would be determined by federal maritime law, not by state law.'4 2 The activ-
ity is maritime, and since the interference has a maritime locale, it is within
admiralty jurisdiction. The right is also federal and maritime in nature.
Therefore, the law governing interference with the right should also be federal
and maritime in nature.
Some fishermen and shellfishermen may not have federal licenses, yet
pollution interference with their activities has the same maritime nexus and
locale. These fishermen and shellfishermen pursue the same transitory marine
species as those persons with federal licenses. If the rights of these fishermen
were originally founded in general maritime law, then the Submerged Lands
Act should not provide any greater source of state authority over them than
over federally licensed fishermen. In this respect, state control over recrea-
tional vessels provides a useful analogy. Recreational vessels operating in
state territorial waters often must be licensed by the state.' 43 Nevertheless, the
consequences of the improper operation of such vessels is still governed by
general maritime law, not state law.144 When adjudicating claims involving
maritime torts committed by or aboard recreational vessels, the overriding
consideration has been to have a uniform body of law establishing minimum
rights and obligations for all vessels and not to distinguish among federally
licensed, foreign licensed or registered, or state licensed vessels.' 45 This con-
sideration is equally compelling in the case of fishermen. The existence or
140. Id at 285.
141. Id at 285-86.
142. The reluctance of the Supreme Court to find implied private remedies in other areas
makes it unlikely that it will find any in the licensing statutes after all these years. See generally
Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell Nor a Morato-
rium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1333 (1980).
143. Eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75A-5 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
144. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th
Cir. 1981).
145. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982); Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); The City of New York, 147 U.S. 72 (1893); The Pennsylvania, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981); Reichenbach v. Smith, 528
F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1976); Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975); Richards v. Blake
Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1975); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974); Wolffv. Whittaker Marine & Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp.
1021 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Armour v. Gradler, 448 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Winter v. Eon Prod,,
- Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. La. 1976).
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nonexistence of a compensable interest should not turn on whether the fisher-
man possesses a federal license. The minimum level of protection should be
the same. Thus, the power to license, which may reflect a number of legiti-
mate state interests, does not necessarily include the power to determine legis-
latively or judicially the consequences of all the maritime activities of the
licensee.
Given this overriding federal policy of establishing a uniform body of
law, the Submerged Lands Act should not be read as constituting congres-
sional authorization for the application of state law to claims for interference
with fisheries in state territorial waters.
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Another federal statute that bears on the question whether claims for pol-
lution of fisheries are governed by maritime law or state law is the FWPCA.'
46
Numerous sections of the FWPCA address the authority of the states over
discharges of pollutants into navigable waters, including the territorial seas.1
47
Application of the act has also been the subject of three relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions-Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc. ,148
Milwaukee v. Illinois,149 and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Association.150 No section of the act or any of these cases, how-
ever, requires the application of state law rather than maritime law to private
damage claims for fishery pollution.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1370
The FWPCA authorizes the states to issue permits and establish water
quality and effluent standards for navigable waters and territorial seas, 151 but
it does not contain any express congressional authorization for the application
of state substantive law to maritime matters. The section of the Act dealing
with the authority of the state over water quality and effluent standards states:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political
subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any
standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution. . .. Or
(2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or
jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary
waters) of such States. 152
This section of the Act cannot reasonably be read as authorizing the applica-
146. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
147. Id §§ 1342, 1370.
148. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
149. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
150. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
151. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342-1343 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
152. Id § 1370 (1976) (emphasis added).
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tion of state law if state law would not have been applied to an activity prior to
the passage of the FWPCA. Evidencing no intent by Congress to authorize
application of state law, the language does nothing more than preserve the
status quo.
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1321
Another section of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. section 1321, addresses the
relationship of state law to that portion of the act dealing with oil spills, but it
likewise does not purport to affect the preexisting division between maritime
activities to which state law may apply and areas to which it may not apply.153
§ 33 U.S.C. section 1321(o) states:
(1) Nothing in this section shall affect or modify in any way
the obligations of any owner or operator of any vessel, or of any
owner or operator of any onshore facility or offshore facility to any
person or agency under any provision of law for damages to any
publicly owned or privately owned property resulting from a dis-
charge of any oil or hazardous substance or from the removal of any
such oil or hazardous substance.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preempting
any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any require-
ment or liability with respect to the discharge of oil or hazardous
substance into any waters within such State.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed. . . to affect any
State or local law not in conflict with this section.
154
This language does not purport to alter the preexisting relationship between
maritime law and state law, but only prevents this section of the FWPCA from
being interpreted as overriding state law.
3. The Effect of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association Upon
Maritime Law
Two recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FWPCA, however,
suggest that any remedy which commercial fishermen may have had under
general maritime law has been supplanted by the statutory and state law reme-
dies that are expressly authorized by the FWPCA. In Milwaukee v. Illinois 155
and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Associa-
tion 15 6 the Supreme Court held that the FWPCA precluded the use of federal
common law as a basis for the recovery of private damages or for injunctive
relief in water pollution cases. Federal common law, of course, is simply
judge-made law. In essence, federal common law deals with questions for
which there is no directly applicable federal statute, but in which there is a
153. Id § 1321 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
154. Id
155. 451 U.S. 304.
156. 453 U.S. 1.
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strong federal interest expressed by a specific constitutional provision or con-
gressional statutory scheme and which requires a uniform national rule to ef-
fectuate the specific constitutional or congressional objectives. 157 The federal
judge creates that rule. If the determination is made that the federal interest
does not require such a rule, the question is resolved according to the law of
the state in which it arose.' 58 Thus, state law always stands in the background
to provide a readily available alternative body of law.
General maritime law is simply the federal common law of admiralty op-
erating in the specialized area of admiralty and maritime matters. 5 9 In the
absence of an applicable federal statute, the determination whether the court
should create a general maritime rule or apply state law depends, as in cases
involving other forms of federal common law, upon the determination
whether the federal interest requires a uniform national maritime rule.160 The
federal interest in having a uniform maritime rule, however, embodies consid-
erations not necessarily present in cases involving other forms of federal com-
mon law. State law may not stand as a readily available alternative. Maritime
claims arise both inside and outside state territorial waters, which raises the
question of the propriety of the extraterritorial application of state law to
claims arising outside state territorial waters. 16 1 Even as to claims arising in
state territorial waters, the interests reflected in the admiralty clause may oper-
157. See M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 80-81. The creation of federal common law in the
absence of some federal statutory scheme is rare. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Generally, authority for the creation of federal
common law is found in some federal statute. In some instances, the statute may delegate author-
ity to the federal courts to create federal common law. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)). In others, a federal statute or statutory
scheme may leave unanswered questions that federal courts decide should be resolved in accord-
ance with some uniform federal rule in order to effectuate the congressional purpose. See, e.g.,
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (31 U.S.C. § 757c(a) (1976)). The mere presence of a federal
statute or some federal interest does not automatically authorize the creation of federal common
law, however. M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 84; see, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25
(1977) (Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1743 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980)); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966) (Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
The creation of general maritime law has proceeded along different lines. As Professor Red-
ish states:
In admiralty, the quasi exclusive grant ofjurisdiction to the federal courts, the absence in
the states of any complete system of maritime laws and remedies, and the tradition of the
maritime law as a separate corpus, of law. . . , have combined to induce a uniform
development of the traditional principles of admiralty in the federal courts, although
with occasional absorption of supplementing state law.
M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 97 n.139 (emphasis added). Congress has never enacted a compre-
hensive body of maritime law, but the federal courts nonetheless have interpreted article III as a
grant of substantive lawmaking power to the courts and have freely created maritime law. See,
e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
398 U.S. 375 (1970); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615
(4th Cir. 1981); see also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 45-47.
158. M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 80-85.
159. Id at 97.
160. Id at 98-105.
161. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. But cf. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69
(1941). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 49-50.
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ate to preclude the application of state law. 162 Finally, there is a need for
uniformity between rules governing claims arising in ocean waters and rules
governing claims arising in territorial waters. 163 Since general maritime law is
a form of federal common law raising special considerations, the question is
whether the FWPCA, or any other federal water pollution control statute, sup-
plants private damage remedies under general maritime law despite these spe-
cial considerations.
The 1981 Milwaukee v. Illinois decision was part of a chain of litigation
stretching back to 1972, when the State of Illinois first sought to enjoin the
City of Milwaukee's discharge of inadequately treated sewage into Lake Mich-
igan.16'4 In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee the Supreme Court declined to exer-
cise original jurisdiction over the controversy on the grounds that Illinois had
available in the district court a federal common law action against the City of
Milwaukee to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters. 165 Im-
mediately after the Supreme Court decision, a federal common law action was
filed by the State of Illinois. 166 Five months later Congress passed the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.167
The federal district court found that Illinois had proven the existence of a
public nuisance under federal common law and ordered the City of Milwau-
kee to eliminate all sewage overflows and to achieve specific effluent limita-
tions in accordance with a plan formulated by the district judge.t68 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that
the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA had not preempted the federal common
162. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Kossick v. United Fruit
Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Kermarec v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S.
372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). But see Askew v. American Water-
ways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310 (1955). See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 48-50.
163. The federal courts generally do not apply one set of rules of substantive law to maritime
torts occurring in territorial waters and a different set to those maritime torts occurring in ocean
waters. See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981). See generally G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 21, at 47-51.
164. 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
165. 406 U.S. at 98-99, 108. The Court held that jurisdiction was not mandatory because the
City of Milwaukee, a political subdivision of the state of Wisconsin, was not itself a "state" within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 125 l(a)(1), which provides that "[t]he Supreme court shall have origi-
nal and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The City of Milwaukee is, for jurisdictional purposes, a
citizen of Wisconsin, and therefore the state of Illinois' right to file an original action in the
Supreme Court against Milwaukee was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980),
which provides that "the Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: . . .
(3) all actions or proceedings by a State against citizens of another State." Jurisdiction under
§ 125 1(b)(3) is not mandatory, and the Supreme Court refused to exercise jurisdiction because the
state of Illinois had an adequate, alternative forum available in federal district court. 406 U.S at
98-99, 108; see also Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
166. The action was filed on May 19, 1972. 451 U.S. at 310.
167. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)). For a comprehensive discussion of the FWPCA, as amended, see Note, Federal Com-
mon Law and Water Pollution: Statutory Preemption or Preservatlon, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500
(1981).
168. 451 U.S. at 311-12.
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law of nuisance, but that in applying the law of public nuisance, the federal
district court should look to the Act for guidance. Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the lower court decision insofar as its plan to control treated
sewage imposed more stringent limitations than those contained in the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency permit and regulations. 169 The Supreme Court
vacated the court of appeals decision, holding that the 1972 amendments to
the FWPCA preempted the federal common law of public nuisance and that
whatever right Illinois had to seek injunctive relief against the City of Milwau-
kee was limited to the statutory and state law remedies expressly authorized by
the FWPCA.'
70
Closely following the Milwaukee v. Illinois litigation, a suit was filed in
1977 by a group of commercial fishermen and shellfishermen against various
governmental entities and officials of the States of New York and New Jersey
and the federal government.17 1 In Middlesex Couny Sewerage Authority v. Na-
tional Sea Clammers Association, plaintiffs, under a variety of legal theories,
sought injunctive and declaratory relief and 250 million dollars in compensa-
tory and 250 million dollars in punitive damages. 172 They alleged that de-
fendants were responsible for the discharge and dumping of sewage and other
waste materals into New York Harbor, the Hudson River, and ocean waters,
thereby causing the widespread destruction of public shellfishing and fishing
grounds and the "collapse of the fishing, clamming and lobster industries
.... 173 Among the issues presented to the United States Supreme Court
was whether any private right of action for water pollution damages based
upon the federal common law of nuisance was entirely preempted by the
FWPCA and the MPRSA, leaving plaintiffs to seek relief under the statu-
tory174 and state law actions authorized by the FWPCA and the MPRSA. The
Court held that the private right was preempted.'
75
Neither Milwaukee v. Illinois nor National Sea Clammers Association de-
cided whether general maritime tort law was preempted by the FWPCA or the
MPRSA. The issue was not presented in Milwaukee v. Illinois, because the
case did not include a maritime tort claim. 17 6 In National Sea Clammers the
169. Id at 312.
170. Id at 326-32.
171. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
172. 453 U.S. at 5 & n.4. Plaintiffs based claims upon the FWPCA, MPRSA, section 13 of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, New York and
New Jersey environmental statutes, the fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Con-
stitution, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and state tort law, 453 U.S. at 5 n.6, and also upon general
maritime tort law, id at 7-8.
173. Id at 5.
174. Id at 10-11.
175. Id at 22.
176. The state of Illinois' complaint was not filed "in admiralty" in district court, and admi-
ralty jurisdiction did not exist for two reasons. First, although the alleged public nuisance oc-
curred in the navigable waters of the U.S. and therefore had a maritime locale, the specific harm
that Illinois was seeking to have abated did not have a "significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity." Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. at 268. Second, even if
the harm bore a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity, the general belief is that
admiralty courts do not have the power to grant purely equitable relief, such as injunctions. See
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court of appeals stated that plaintiffs had alleged the existence of a maritime
tort, 177 but the Supreme Court avoided deciding the issue by limiting the grant
of certiorari to three questions:
"(i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private right of action in-
dependent of their citizen suit provision, (ii) whether all federal com-
mon law nuisance actions concerning ocean pollution now are pre-
empted by the legislative scheme contained in the FWPCA and the
MPRSA, and (iii) if not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue
for damages under the federal common law of nuisance .... 178
Although the Court did not address the general maritime law tort claim, it
expressed a view about the continued viability of federal judge-made law in
light of the "comprehensive" federal water pollution statutes.1 79 Early in the
opinion, the Court observed that "the federal common law of nuisance had
been fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution."' 80 At the end of its
opinion, the Court stated:
This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal common law
claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the pre-emptive effect
of the FWPCA is any less when pollution of coastal waters is at issue.
To the extent that this case involves ocean waters not covered by the
FWPCA, and regulated under the MPRS4, we see no causefor difer-
ent treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory scheme of
the MPRSA is no less 'omprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping,
than are analogousprovisions of the FWPC4.I 18
The facet of the plaintiffs' action the Court was addressing at the end of the
opinion was the claim for damages to fishing and shellfishing as a result of the
dumping of pollutants in ocean waters, a claim traditionally regarded as mari-
time in nature and governed, in the absence of a controlling federal statute, by
general maritime law, not federal common law.'
8 2
The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599 (1890); Sound Marine & Mach. Corp. v. Westchester County, 100 F.2d
360 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 642 (1939). But see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania
Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950); Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 599 F.2d
10 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1980).
177. National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 616 F.2d 1222, 1236
(2d Cir. 1980), rev'dsub nonm Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1 (1981).
178. 453 U.S. at 10-I1. The Supreme Court held that an implied private cause of action for
violation of the FWPCA or MPRSA did not exist in view of the elaborate enforcement provisions
contained in these acts. Id at 13-21. The Court discussed Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), em-
phasizing that one of the important factors in determining whether private remedies should be
implied is the legislative history, which in National Sea Clammers Association led to the conclu-
sion that Congress did not also intend to create private remedies. Id at 20-21. See generally
Hazen, supra note 142. Whether there should be implied private remedies as part of the FWPCA
or MPRSA is beyond the scope of this article. A different question is whether there is a private
damage remedy under general maritime law. The existence of this preexisting private damage
remedy depends upon whether Congress intended to preserve or displace it.
179. 453 U.S. at 22.
180. Id at 11.
181. Id at 22 (emphasis added).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 70-76. As will be discussed later, the phrase "federal
common law" means different things at different times. It may refer to the right of trial by jury; it
may refer to a system of substantive law; or it may refer to the manner of declaring law. In
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), and Middlesex County Sewarage Auth. v. National
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The easy, and perhaps, the correct answer to the question of what effect
Milwaukee v. Illinois and National Sea Clammers Association have upon the
general maritime tort of public nuisance in water pollution cases may be that
they have none. The Supreme Court has given frequent lessons on how to
read its decisions to attorneys, lower courts, commentators, and even Con-
gress.' 83 In the cases at issue, the Court did not address the impact of the
FWPCA or the MPRSA upon general maritime law, but only upon federal
common law.' 8 4 When the Court addresses one issue it is not addressing an-
other, even related issue. The reference at the end of the opinion to matters
covered by the MPRSA and the availability of a private right of action for
damages based upon federal common law thus may have no bearing on pri-
vate rights of action under general maritime law. But the stated holding does
encompass pollution of ocean waters. Both the holding and the language at
the end of the opinion raise two questions: (1) why general maritime law
should be treated differently than federal common law, and (2) what the an-
swer to the first question implies for private damage actions based upon claims
of pollution of fisheries in territorial and ocean waters.
The FWPCA and the MPRSA have as their common objective limiting
the amount of pollutants discharged from land facilities and other point
sources of pollution, or from water based facilities and vessels, into the naviga-
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981), the Court appears to have referred to federal common law
as a method of declaring law (i.e., judge-made law) and as a system of law (combining principles
permitting recovery of damages at law with those permitting the granting of equitable relief).
183. The decisions that preceded enactment of the Merchant Marine (Jones) Act of 1920, ch.
250, 41 Stat. 988 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.), and the federal Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, 947-950 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) are examples of such Supreme
Court instruction. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S.
375 (1924); Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
184. In Milwaukee v. Illinois there are indications that the Court was addressing the question
of the impact of the FWPCA and MPRSA upon general maritime law. The Court discussed what
its role should be after Congress has addressed a question previously controlled by federal com-
mon law. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978) was one of the cases used to
illustrate the Court's point-federal common law is displaced once Congress addresses an issue.
The issue in Mobil Oil was whether a party could recover damages for loss of society under gen-
eral maritime law for deaths covered by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761-767 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), even though the Act had not provided for such damages. The
Court held that the federal courts could not permit recovery of such damages when DOHSA
evidenced an intent not to permit recovery. The situation in Mobil Oil, however, can be distin-
guished from the one discussed in this article. DOHSA created a statutory wrongful death action
for deaths outside territorial waters. As part of the Act, Congress specifically dealt with the types
of damages that would be recoverable. Congress, however, did not expressly deal with damage
claims for maritime torts in either the FWPCA or MPRSA. Therefore, under those circumstances
the issue is whether Congress intended to preserve general maritime remedies, and not whether
the Court may substitute a damage scheme different from one already provided by Congress.
The Court in Milwaukee also cited Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S.
310 (1955), another case involving a question of general maritime law, while discussing problems
associated with the application of federal common law. 451 U.S. at 325. Thus, it can be argued
the Court was including general maritime law within federal common law when it held that any
private damage claim based upon the federal common law of nuisance was precluded by the
FWPCA and MPRSA. Id When read in the context of the entire opinion, however, the citation
does not necessarily lead to that conclusion. See infra text accompanying notes 233-42.
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ble and ocean waters subject to the control of the United States Govern-
ment.' 85 The FWPCA creates a statutory framework under which the EPA, in
addition to other mandates, establishes minimum effluent limitations and
grants permits to those seeking to discharge pollutants into waters.18 6 The
states are permitted by the FWPCA to impose higher standards of conduct,
the breach of which can result in the issuance of state abatement orders or the
holding of the pollutor liable for damages under state laws to public entities or
private persons.' 87 The MPRSA covers ocean. waters 88 and operates in a
similar fashion, 189 except that the states may only propose criteria to the EPA,
which the EPA may adopt as its own if it determines the proposed criteria are
not inconsistent with the MPRSA. 190
Neither the FWPCA nor the MPRSA has as its objective the creation of
private damage actions for injuries arising out of the pollution of navigable or
ocean waters.19' Both acts have a provision for citizens' suits, but such suits
are limited to seeking the establishment of effluent standards or limitations, or
the enforcement of such limitations or standards through injunctive relief or
similar orders. 192 Neither act, however, purports to provide exclusive reme-
dies for water pollution injuries. 193 Each contains a "saving clause" that is
intended to preserve for injured persons their rights under at least some of the
preexisting law.'
94
185. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a), 1401 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see also Prevention of Pollution from
Ships Act of 1980, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1911 (Supp. IV 1980).
186. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally Zener, The FederalLasv of
Water Pollution Control in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 683-87 (1974). Not everyone who
discharges pollutants must have a permit. A permit under the FWPCA is not required for dis-
charges that are sent to publicly owned treatment facilities, but the facility itself must have a
permit. The spilling or dumping of certain hazardous substances is subject to a separate regula-
tory scheme, and vessel sewage is the subject of a separate section of the FWPCA. See Zener,
supra, at 686-87.
187. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)-(d), 1370 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
188. Id §§ 1401-1444; see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
189. 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976).
190. Id § 1416.
191. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammer Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
192. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), 1415(g) (1976); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981).
193. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 326-29.
194. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1415(g)(5) (1976). Although it is not clear that Congress was con-
sidering federal common law when these sections were drafted, Congress is presumed to be aware
ofall preexisting laws when enacting regulatory schemes. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696,
707-08 (1961). The Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1 (1981), held that claims based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) have
been supplanted by the comprehensive remedial devices contained in the FWPCA and MPRSA.
According to the Court, the laiguage of these clauses, see infra notes 195-96 and accompanying
text, does not support the view that Congress expressly preserved § 1983 remedies for violations of
these statutes:
there is little reason to believe that Congress intended such a result when it made refer-
ence in § 505(e) [33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976)] to "any right which any person . . . may
have under any statute or common law or to seek. . . any other relief." The legislative
history makes clear Congress' intent to allow further enforcement of antipollution stan-
dards arising under other statutes or state common law. . . . A suit for damages assert-
ing a substantive violation of the FWPCA or the MPRSA is far different, even if the
remedy asserted is based on the separate right of action created in § 1983. We are con-
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The FWPCA savings clause, which is similar to the MPRSA clause, 195
provides in subsection (e), "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right
which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)."'
196
In Milwaukee v. Illinois and National Sea Clammers Association the Court held
that private relief available under other federal or state statutes and state com-
mon law remedies for nuisance were preserved by the section, 197 but suggested
that the phrase "common law" did not include "federal common law" and
referred only to "routine state common law. ' 198 The Court, however, cited
broader grounds for its decision that private rights of action for water pollu-
tion based upon federal common law were preempted by the Act. It held that
even assuming that "common law" included "federal common law," such a
reading only meant that federal common law remedies were not preempted by
the subsection authorizing citizens' actions, not that federal common law was
not preempted by the entire Act. It was the Court's view that this subsection
contained language commonly accompanying provisions for citizen suits in
environmental acts, and represented only the general congressional concern
that by passage of this subsection, other preexisting remedies would not be
disturbed. Passage of this subsection thus did not represent a legislative intent
that the rest of the Act not displace federal common law.199
Assuming, as we must, that the Court correctly decided that Congress
intended the entire FWPCA and MPRSA to supplant federal common law
and that "common law" as used in the savings clauses of both the FWPCA
and MPRSA does not include "federal common law," the continued existence
of a general maritime tort claim for private damages for nuisance depends
upon establishing that Congress did not intend to supplant general maritime
law and that general maritime remedies are preserved by the "saving clause."
Establishing these propositions requires an examination of the differences be-
tween federal common law and general maritime law, as well as the legal
vinced that the saving clauses do not refer at all to a suit for redress of a violation of
these statutes-regardless of the source of the right of action asserted.
453 U.S. at 20 n.31.
In Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 329 (1981) the Court noted that "even indulging the
unlikely assumption that the reference to 'common law' in § 505(e) includes the limited federal
common law as opposed to the more routine state common law" does not mean that "the Act as a
whole does not supplant formerly available federal common-law actions but only that the particu-
lar section authorizing citizen suits does not do so." "Congress knows how to say 'nothing in this
Act' when it means to .... " Id at 329 n.22.
195. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5) (1976) provides:
The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the Adminstrator, the Secretary, or a State agency).
196. Id § 1365(e) (emphasis added).
197. See 453 U.S. at 20 n.31; 451 U.S. at 328-29. For a discussion of the effect of the FWPCA
and MPRSA upon actions based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra note 194.
198. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 329.
199. Id at 329 & n.22; see supra note 194.
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backdrop against which Congress passed the FWPCA and the MPRSA and
the Supreme Court decided Milwaukee v. Illinois and National Sea Claminmers
Association.
a. The FWPCA and Federal Common Law Remedies
Both federal common law and general maritime law are similar in that
both bodies of law are judicially created and trace their ultimate legitimacy
back to article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution. Each, however,
has a different history and distinctive scope. Federal common law springs pri-
marily from article III's grant to the federal courts of judicial power "to all
cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Author-
ity .... -200 For the most part, it consists of a limited body of judicially cre-
ated principles that govern the rights and liabilities of persons in land based
activities, transactions, or occurrences. A central theme underlying the con-
cept of federal common law is that the federal courts' power to develop a body
ofjudicially created rules of law is severely constrained.20 ' Under the Consti-
tution, the primary responsibility for the development of a body of law, either
statutory or common law, to govern the daily activities of the body politic is in
the hands of the states, with limited areas withdrawn from the states and in-
cluded in the legislative power of Congress. 202 In those areas over which the
states have initial primary responsibility, the federal courts, even though they
may have jurisdictional competence, do not have the power to develop and
apply their own concepts of judicially created law.
203
Federal common law is thus viewed as a limited creation, which operates
interstitially to fill gaps in congressional legislation or to effectuate congres-
sional statutory patterns or constitutional mandates.2°4 It is a temporal body
of law, easily and frequently displaced by congressional action.205 In Milwau-
200. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
201. If the transaction involves either a maritime contract, a tort occurring on the navigable
waters of the U.S. that has a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activities," or a fed-
eral statute governing maritime matters, admiralty and maritime law, not federal common law, is
controlling. See, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); Kos-
sick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960);
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) I (1871). In some instances federal common law may be identical to general maritime law,
but conceptually the two bodies of law are distinct. A federal district court has subject matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) over claims based upon federal com-
mon law, but this section does not grant jurisdiction over general maritime law claims. Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354 (1959). Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over general maritime law claims
either under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976), in which case there is no right to a jury trial, or, if diversity
of citizenship exists, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(1) (1976).
202. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 316; see also Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 498, 530-31 (1954).
203. See, e.g., 451 U.S. at 317.
204. Id at 324-25 & n.18; Hart, supra note 202, at 498; Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal
Law'" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rulesfor Declsion, 105 U.
PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957).
205. 451 U.S. at 310-17 & n.9.
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kee v. Illinois the Supreme Court emphasized that when the question is
whether federal statutory law or federal common law applies, a court starts
with the assumption that federal statutory law controls, and when Congress
moves to occupy a field previously controlled by federal common law, federal
common law is readily displaced.20 6 Thus, the grant of power to create federal
common law implies infrequent use with careful consideration of the judicial
role and of the delicate balance between state and federal legislative
competence.
When the State of Illinois first sued the City of Milwaukee and invoked
the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, the pre-1972 ver-
sion of the FWPCA did not contain an effective enforcement mechanism, a
provision for a citizen suit, or a comprehensive framework for the issuance of
EPA and state regulations and permits.207 The Supreme Court recognized the
existence of a federal common law remedy to abate a public nuisance in inter-
state or public waters because the enforcement mechanism of the pre-1972
FWPCA was not viewed as an exclusive federal remedy.208 Had the Court
viewed the pre-1972 enforcement mechanism as an exclusive federal remedy,
the FWPCA would have precluded the creation of any federal common law
remedial devices operating interstitially to effectuate the policy and the ex-
pressed congressional concern for protection of the quality of the nation's wa-
ters. 209 The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA, however, were intended to
establish an "all encompassing program of water pollution regulation" with an
elaborate set of enforcement procedures. 210 Thus, after 1972, private federal
common law enforcement mechanisms to help ensure the federal objectives of
water pollution control were unnecessary 21' and could, if federal judges set
effluent standards that were different from those permitted by the Act, upset
the balance struck by Congress in the FWPCA regulatory scheme.
212
The recognition of federal common law in the 1972 Illinois v. City of Mil-
waukee suit not only provided a body of law to resolve the dispute, but be-
cause federal common law claims can be the basis of federal question
206. Id at 313-14; see, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (fed-
eral maritime common law preempted by Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-767 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 115 (1972) (federal com-
mon law of nuisance may have been preempted by Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 563 (1963) (federal common law of equitable
apportionment preempted by Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-618 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 579 (E.D. Va. 1972) (federal common
law of nuisance preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), modpfed on other
grounds, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976).
207. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
208. Id at 107-08.
209. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 319.
210. Id at 318.
211. Id at 317; see Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453
U.S. at 14-15.
212. The federal district court created exactly such a conflict in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
at 311-12, 325 n.18 (court found that Milwaukee had created a common-law nuisance, and pro-
ceeded to order operating procedures and set effluent standards that were stricter than those con-
tained in Milwaukee's EPA permit).
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jurisdiction, the recognition of the right also provided a forum to hear inter-
state disputes over water quality.21 3 The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA,
however, eliminated the need for federal common law as the basis for access to
a forum in such cases by providing for a hearing before state and federal agen-
cies to adjust the potential conflicts that might arise between the states.2 14 Pri-
vate citizens or groups were also granted the opportunity to express their
concerns,21 5 with access to a federal forum in limited circumstances. 21 6 Per-
sons with an interest in the establishment of standards may participate in the
EPA or state administrative process; 217 those who are injured either by the
EPA's failure to establish standards or by a violation of established standards
may bring suit for injunctive or similar relief in the federal courts under the
FWPCA citizen suit provisions.2 18 The FWPCA also recognizes and pre-
serves state damage or injunctive remedies for water pollution based upon
state common law of nuisance or upon state statute. When the states provide
such remedies, private citizens or groups who experience economic injuries
because of violations of the FWPCA may bring suit for recovery of damages
under state law.
219
The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA thus eliminated the two supporting
rationales for federal common law: the need for adequate enforcement mech-
anisms to effectuate congressional water quality objectives and the unavaila-
bility of a forum to resolve conflicting interests in water quality standards.
With the supporting rationales eclipsed, the continued need for a federal com-
mon law abatement or damage remedy likewise disappeared.220 Milwaukee v.
Illinois eliminated the federal common law abatement remedy; National Sea
Clammers Association eliminated the federal common law damage remedy,
These interstitial remedial devices designed to effectuate congressional objec-
tives were now supplanted by the new congressional scheme.
b. FWPCA and General Maritime Law
The FWPCA, the MPRSA, other environmental acts, Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois, and National Sea Clammers Association have taken their toll in the area
of general maritime law as well. This part of the article will demonstrate,
however, that their effect is limited to preclusion of private injunctive relief
based upon maritime principles. 22 ' Private damages may still be recovered.
213. 406 U.S. at 107 & n.9.
214. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 326; 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3), (b)(5), (d)(4) (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
215. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976).
216. Id § 1313.
217. Id § 1314.
218. Id § 1365.
219. Id
220. Milwaukee v. Illnois, 451 U.S. at 325-26; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clamners Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 14-15.
221. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 326-29; Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clarnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 14-15; see also infra note 256.
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i. General Maritime Law: A Separate Legal History
General maritime law is not the same interstitial creature as federal com-
mon law. The federal judiciary has a far more expansive role to play in the
development of maritime law than nonmaritime federal common law.
22 2
General maritime law springs from a different portion of article III, section 2
than does federal common law; it originates in the grant ofjudicial power over
"[c]ases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. '22 3 Neither article I nor arti-
cle III specifically addresses the power of Congress to enact legislation gov-
erning admiralty or maritime matters, or the federal courts' power to create
substantive admiralty rules of law, but the courts interpreted article III as en-
compassing both the predominant power of Congress to legislate in admiralty
or maritime matters224 and, in the absence of such legislation, the federal
courts' power to declare substantive maritime law.225 Furthermore, courts de-
termined that the subject matter-admiralty or maritime matters-was not
within the lawmaking competence of the state legislatures or courts, except in
very limited situations.226 Congress, for the most part, has left it to the federal
courts to develop and articulate the substantive body of rules governing mari-
time matters. The response of the courts has been the development of a broad
body of federal decisional law that touches on almost every aspect of every
activity that occurs on the navigable waters or seas.
227
It should be remembered, however, that although Congress has acted in-
frequently in matters of maritime law, when it does act its statutory pro-
nouncements supplant any judicially created law. In Milwaukee v. Illinois
Justice Rehnquist provided a specific example of this process when he used
Mobil Oil Corp. V. Higgenbotham22 s to illustrate his point that once Congress
addresses a question, the Court is not free to apply judicially created maritime
principles that conflict with the congressional mandate.229 In Higgenbotham
the plaintiff in a wrongful death action sought to recover for "loss of society,"
an item of damages recoverable in a wrongful death action under general mar-
222. See, e.g., In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Texas
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640-42 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-97 (1981); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282, 285 (1952).
223. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
224. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959).
225. See generall, G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 45-51.
226. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); see also supra note 64. The
area in which state legislatures and state courts may constitutionally prescribe rules of conduct for
maritime matters fluctuates, depending on how broadly the Supreme Court defines the area of
exclusive federal authority. The most extreme position foreclosing state action is represented by
Southern Pac. Co. Y. Jensen, a position that has been eroded over the years. See, e.g., Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1972); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). Nevertheless, it still remains viable in certain circumstances. See,
e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 344 (1972); Kossick v. United
Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); see also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 47-48; supra
note 64.
227. The breadth of judicially created federal maritime law is easily seen in G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 21.
228. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
229. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 315.
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itime law230 but not recoverable under the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA). 231 Since plaintiff's husband's death occurred in the area of the sea
covered by the DOHSA, the congressional legislation and not general mari-
time law was controlling.232 Thus, the answer to the question whether the
FWPCA or the MPRSA supplants the general maritime law of public nui-
sance as they do the federal common law of public nuisance must be deter-
mined by an analysis of whether Congress intended to displace general
maritime law as well as federal common law.
ii. No Presumption of Displacement of General Maritime Law by the
FWPCA Is Justified
The presumption of the Supreme Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois and Na-
tional Sea Clammers Association-when Congress moves to occupy an area
previously governed by federal common law, federal common law is sup-
planted even though Congress may not provide a private damage remedy for
violation of the federal statute-is not applicable to matters controlled by gen-
eral maritime law.233 When federal common law is displaced, private parties
are not left without a forum or remedy. Individual rights may be asserted in
state courts and are protected by state law. If Congress legislates in an area
previously governed by general maritime law, however, the state legislature
and courts may lack the power to legislate or promulgate rules for maritime
activities outside state territorial waters or the power to assert personal juris-
diction over nonresident defendants based upon extraterritorial activities. 234
Therefore, it should not be presumed, in the absence of explicit language evi-
dencing such an intent, that Congress intended to eliminate a preexisting pri-
vate right under general maritime law, thereby leaving remediless persons
damaged by the very conduct Congress finds reprehensible. 235 The presump-
tion in such a situation should be the opposite: Congress did not intend to
disturb any portion of the preexisting law other than that with which it has
230. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1974).
231. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976); 414 U.S. at 587.
232. DOHSA applies only to deaths outside territorial waters. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
Wrongful deaths occurring on territorial seas are governed by general maritime law. Moragne v.
States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 394-409 (1970).
233. In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 336-38 (2d Cir. 1981); see, e.g., American Ex-
port Lines v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 585-90;
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); United States v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 236 (1952); The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540 (1899).
In Oswego Barge the Second Circuit held that the government claim for recovery of oil spill
cleanup costs was foreclosed by the FWPCA. The FWPCA contains specific, detailed provisions
for recovery of cleanup costs. Because government recovery under general maritime law would be
inconsistent with the congressional scheme, the general maritime claim was preempted by the
FWPCA. 664 F.2d at 340-44.
234. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (no personal jurisdic-
tion); Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 321 (1909) (state may not prosecute a person for activities
that occur in another state's territorial waters and are permitted by the second state); G. GILMORE
& C. BLACK, supra note 21, § 1-17, at 47-50.
235. In Oswego Barge, however, the language and legislative history of the FWPCA fore-





The presumption that private damage actions based upon the general
maritime law of public nuisance are not disturbed by FWPCA, and MPRSA is
less strong when the activity that serves as the basis for the action occurs
within state territorial waters. When the water pollution occurs in state territo-
rial waters, the application of state law exists as an alternative, and state
courts, which could assert long arm personal jurisdiction, stand as an alterna-
tive' forum. Nonetheless, nothing in the legislative history of the FWPCA in-
dicates that Congress intended to eliminate admiralty law as a basis for private
damage actions arising in state territorial waters.
Furthermore, when Congress acts to occupy an area previously governed
by federal common law, the displacement of federal common law, even in the
absence of a congressionally provided damage remedy, occurs because the
purpose for its existence has disappeared. The original primary purpose for its
existence was to effectuate some national policy that goes beyond the interests
of the parties. 237 Provision of private injunctive relief or a private damage
remedy is incidental to the primary purpose. The parties thus are simply tools
in achieving a narrowly defined national objective, and when Congress pro-
vides new tools, the old may be discarded.
But maritime law, which grows out of the national interest in maritime
activities, has as one of its objectives the provision of remedies to private par-
ties for private maritime claims. 38 Providing such remedies is the very reason
for its existence. The fact that Congress has dealt with one aspect of a mari-
time relationship does not mean that another related aspect is extinguished,
whatever effect similar congressional action has upon federal common law.
For example, Congress passed DOHSA in 1923, creating a statutory wrongful
death action for deaths occurring on the high seas.239 The existence of
DOHSA precludes the recovery of "loss of society" damages in situations cov-
ered by the Act,240 but the existence of DOHSA does not preclude the creation
of a general maritime wrongful death action for deaths occurring within terri-
torial waters or the recovery of damages for loss of society in such cases.24 1
Nor did DOHSA extinguish the general maritime right to recover for wrong-
ful death in territorial waters, thereby leaving recoveries for such deaths to be
236. See srra note 233.
237. See generally M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 79-97. Maritime law is a branch of federal
common law. Id at 97-105. Also, as in all situations involving any form of federal common law,
there is some federal interest present. In the case of maritime law that interest is generally one of
uniformity of law. Thus, it can also be said that provisions for private damage or injunctive relief
under maritime law are incidental to its primary purpose. But properly viewed, the primary pur-
pose of maritime law is to provide a uniform set of rules for private parties engaged in an activity
intrinsically bound with the national interest. It is the nature of this private activity that consti-
tutes the national interest.
238. Id
239. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
240. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
241. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet,
414 U.S. 573 (1974).
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controlled by state law.242 The same analysis would apply to the FWPCA and
MPRSA. The acts deal with only one aspect of the maritime tort of water
pollution, the ability to obtain injunctive relief; they do not deal, or even pur-
port to deal, with the other aspect of the maritime tort, the ability to recover
damages. That private consequence of the tort is left where it has always been:
to be determined by general maritime law.
iii. General Maritime Law as "Common Law" Preserved by FWPCA and
MPRSA Saving Clauses
Preservation of a private maritime damage action is also consistent with
the language of the FWPCA and MPRSA "saving clauses." The saving
clauses of the FWPCA and the MPRSA appear in provisions authorizing citi-
zen suits for injunctive relief to enforce the substantive law of the respective
acts.243 Each saving clause provides that the authorization of citizen enforce-
ment suits "shall [not] restrict any right which any person. . . may have under
any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any [effluent] standard or
limitation or to seek any other relief."244 Both refer to "common law," not
"maritime law," even though one, MPRSA, is legislating in an area in which,
in the absence of legislation, maritime law is controlling.2 45 It can be argued
that if Congress wished to preserve remedies under "general maritime law" it
could have made express reference to it. Thus, the express inclusion of "com-
mon law" and the exclusion of "maritime law" arguably operates to save only
"common law" remedies and not "maritime law remedies. '246 But Congress
probably was not focusing upon any differences that may exist between "fed-
eral common law" and "general maritime law."'247 The use of "common law"
in all likelihood was not intended to refer to a mode of trial-jury trial-or to
a particular system of substantive law, but instead to refer to judge-made as
opposed to statutory law. Nothing in the legislative history of either statute
would indicate that Congress had in mind anything other than the distinction
between statutory and judge-made law when it debated, drafted, and enacted
the FWPCA and the MPRSA. This conclusion is consistent with the construc-
242. 436 U.S. 618.
243. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365, 1415(g) (1976).
244. Id § 1365(e) (emphasis added). The MPRSA saving clause has wording similar to that
of the FWPCA saving clause. The MPRSA saving clause reads as follows:
The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any
person (or class or persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforce-
ment of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the
Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency).
Id § 1415(g)(5).
245. See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text.
246. The Court's statements in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 329 n.22, that Congress
knows how to say what it means, and that courts should read an act as it is written, could be cited
in support of this point.
247. The saving clause language of the MPRSA uses the term "common law," even though the
legislation is in an area in which maritime law would otherwise apply. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5),
Thus, "common law" as used by Congress in this instance probably refers to 'judge-made" law,




tion the courts have given similar language in the past. The phrase "common
law" in a statute has been construed to refer to judge-made law and, therefore,
to encompass "general maritime law." 248
Even if the legislative history provides no basis for concluding that the
phrase "common law" excludes "general maritime law," the Supreme Court's
construction of the phrase in Milwaukee v. Illinois does. In Milwaukee v. Il/i-
nois the Court implied that "common law" refers to a particular body of sub-
stantive law and not to judge-made law in general.24 9 In the Court's view, the
most likely meaning of that phrase was "routine state common law," exclud-
ing "limited federal common law."'2 50 The court implied that section 1365(e)
of the FWPCA had similar limited meaning in its National Sea Clammers As-
sociation decision as well.25 1 In both cases this interpretation was dictum
since the Supreme Court ultimately predicated its decision on an assumption
that even if section 1365(e) of the FWPCA or section 1415(g)(5) of the
MPRSA or both included federal common law, Congress intended that the
FWPCA and the MPRSA preempt any right under the federal common law to
seek an abatement of a public nuisance or any similar private right to dam-
ages.252 Thus, the avenue, albeit narrow, is still open for a construction of the
phrase to include general maritime law remedies.
iv. General Maritime Law Preserved as a "Right. . . Under. . . [a]
Statute" by Saving Clause of FWPCA
An alternative approach is to focus upon the phrase "any statute." The
lower federal court's authority both to hear admiralty cases and to fashion
principles of general maritime law have been given to them by Congress in 28
U.S.C. section 1333.253 Although the statute is jurisdictional in scope, because
of the nature of general maritime law it is also a source of substantive judicial
lawmaking authority.2 54 If the rights of commercial fishermen have their
source in general maritime law created under the authority of 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 1333, then the rights are under a "statute," and are preserved by the say-
248. See United States v. W.M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 191 (1970), in which the Court said
that Congress in the Social Security Act:
used the phrase "use common law rules" in a generic sense, to mean the standards devel-
oped by the courts through years of adjudication [i.e., "judge-made law"] rather than in
a technical sense to mean those standards developed by "common law" courts as op-
posed to courts of admiralty. Maritime law, the common law of seafaring men, provides
an established network of rules and distinctions that are practically suited to the necessi-
ties of the sea, just as land based decisional law provides a body of rules adapted to the
various forms of domestic employment.
See also N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY 131-134 (1974).
249. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 329.
250. Id
251. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 20 n.31.
252. Id at 21-22; Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 328-29; see also In reOswego Barge Corp.,
664 F.2d at 343-44 (government maritime claims for reasonable cost ofoil cleanup under a public
nuisance theory were preempted by a detailed provision of FWPCA regarding government recov-
ery of oil spill cleanup costs).
253. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359-61 (1959).
254. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
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ing clause.25
5
Absent any expression of congressional intent to eliminate preexisting
rights under general maritime law, the FWPCA should not be viewed as pre-
empting general maritime law, except to the limited extent of preempting any
right to seek injunctive relief if prior to the passage of the 1972 amendments
injunctive relief would have been available under general maritime law.
256
The FWPCA does have explicit provisions for citizen suits seeking injunctive
relief, and those provisions will override any judicially created right to such
relief in maritime water pollution cases.257 With respect to claims for dam-
ages, however, the FWPCA and MPRSA saving clauses may be read as pre-
serving such remedies under general maritime law, and the FWPCA and
255. The Supreme Court held in National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.at 19-20, that the
express remedies provided by Congress precluded any remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See supra
note 194.
The right under general maritime law to sue for pollution of fisheries does not necessarily
involve a suit asserting the right to damages for a substantive violation of the FWPCA or
MPRSA. Such statutory violations formed the basis of the plaintiffs' claims in National Sea Clam-
mers under § 1983. This right is simply the maritime parallel of the state common-law right to
recover damages in a public nuisance case, a right that the Court recognized as being preserved.
Although a substantive violation of either the FWPCA or MPRSA may be relevant to the mari-
time claim, as it also may be to a state law claim, the existence of the right is no more dependent
upon the FWPCA or MPRSA standard than is any state common-law claim. But see In re Os-
wego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 340-44 (2d Cir. 1981).
In National Sea Clammers the suit was against public officials and entities. The express en-
forcement provisions of FWPCA and MPRSA may well be the exclusive means of enforcing the
acts against public officials and entities, but use of these enforcement provisions may not be neces-
sary in damage actions brought against private parties that pollute fisheries. Private maritime
actions against private parties do not raise the same concerns about federalism or about interfer-
ence with the statutory enforcement schemes.
256. Historically, admiralty courts have been said to lack the jurisdiction of equity because of
the common-law distinction between law, equity, and admiralty. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 21, at 41. The Supreme Court held in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del
Caribe, S-4. that there is "no restriction upon admiralty by chancery so unrelenting as to bar the
grant of any equitable relief even when that relief is subsidiary to issues wholly within admiralty
jurisdiction." 339 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1950). In Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962) the
Court (in discussing an award of counsel's fees) said, "Equity is no stranger in admiralty; admi-
ralty courts are, indeed, authorized to grant equitable relief."
Lower federal courts have relied on these two cases, and on congressional extension of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to admiralty cases, in holding that admiralty can award
whatever relief is appropriate in a given case, including equitable relief. In Lewis v. S.S. Baine,
although the court denied injunctive relief because irreparable injury was not shown, it found
after thoroughly reviewing the cases that "there should be little doubt today that courts of admi-
ralty, in proper cases, may invoke the equitable tool of injunction." 534 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir.
1976). In Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., the First Circuit held that admiralty courts "may
award injunctive relief in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 in situations where such relief would
be appropriate on land." 599 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 900 (1980). In light
of these cases and the unification of admiralty with other civil actions, it is doubtful that the
traditional rule is still good law.
On the surface this development appears consistent with the trend in implied private remedy
cases, in which courts have been more inclined to find a private injunctive remedy than a private
damage remedy. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
The FWPCA citizen suit provision permits plaintiffs to enforce the FWPCA and MPRSA through
injunctive suits even though their injuries are "'non-economic' and probably noncompensable."
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 16-17; see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1976). Thus, the
FWPCA and MPRSA expressly permit injunctive suits by parties who could not bring a damage
suit under federal common law, general maritime law, or state common law.
257. See supra note 255.
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MPRSA may be perceived as not preempting any damage remedy under gen-
eral maritime law.
IV. STATE LAW AND MARITIME LAW APPLIED CONCURRENTLY TO
MARITIME WATER POLLUTION TORTS
A. State Law May be Applied to Increase the Rights of Commercial
Fishermen but Not to Decrease Those Rights
The continued availability of a private damage remedy under general
maritime law does not necessarily mean the unavailability of state law reme-
dies when the maritime tort of water pollution occurs in state territorial waters.
The two bodies of law are not always mutually exclusive. In some circum-
stances state law may be applied concurrently with maritime law. The in-
stances in which this may occur are not completely clear, but there seem to be
two general lines of cases on the issue. In some cases, the application of state
law to a maritime tort was not permitted because the Court believed complete
uniformity of maritime law was required.258 In other cases, the Court has
permitted the application of state law, even though the result was a lack of
uniformity, but only when the application of state law had the effect of in-
creasing, not decreasing, the protection afforded the maritime interest.25 9 This
principle would appear to be controlling in maritime water pollution cases and
is consistent with the Supreme Court decision inAskew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc. 260
In Askew one issue was whether a Florida act that imposed strict liability
upon vessels and shore facilities for oil pollution damages incurred by the
State or private persons conflicted with the Water Quality Improvement Act of
1970.261 The Court held that the federal legislation did not purport to provide
any remedies for damages experienced by private persons and, therefore, left
the states free "to impose 'liability' in damages for losses suffered both by the
States and by private interests.
262
The other issue addressed by the Court in Askew was whether Florida
constitutionally could exercise its police power over maritime activities con-
currently with the federal government. 263 Neither party contended that state
law conflicted with a general maritime rule. Rather, the question was whether
application of state law was foreclosed because the remedy in admiralty was
exclusive.264 In the discussion of the relationship between state law and mari-
time activities, Askew makes no mention of shore to sea or sea to sea pollution
258. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917); supra note 64.
259. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Ins. Fund Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). See generally Currie, supra note 57, at 218-21.
260. 411 U.S. 325.
261. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (superseded and amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
262. 411 U.S. at 336.
263. Id. at 337.
264. Id at 337-38, 343.
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cases-the types that would most likely involve fishermen. The discussion is
limited to "shoreside injuries by ships on navigable waters, '265 historically an
area that, before the passage of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act of
1948, would have been within the jurisdiction of the states.266 In Askew the
Court held only that the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act did not "si-
lently" deprive the states of the power to enact laws covering shoreside
injuries.
2 67
There is language in Askew that would support the application of state
law to claims of fishermen and shellfishermen. 268 Among the private interests
specifically mentioned in the case that a state might legitimately seek to protect
consistently with the FWPCA were the interests of commercial fishermen and
shellfishermen. 269 Consideration of this language in light of the rest of the
opinion and other Court decisions leads to the conclusion that state law may
provide additional remedies, and not that state law is either the exclusive
source of such rights or that state law may in any way diminish the rights that
exist under general maritime law.270
Prior decisions have established that state law may supplement the rights
protected by maritime law by providing additional remedies or imposing a
higher standard of care. In Hess v. United States the Court held that an Ore-
gon wrongful death statute which imposed a higher duty of care upon mari-
time employers could be applied in the case of the death of a maritime
worker.271 Maritime law recognized a claim for personal injuries, but because
the Court believed that the general common-law rule-that a claim for per-
sonal injuries was extinguished by the death of the injured party-applied in
maritime cases as well and could only be modified by legislative action, gen-
eral maritime law did not provide a wrongful death action.272 To avoid the
anomaly of a tortfeasor being in a better position if a person were actually
killed as the result of a maritime tort rather than seriously injured, the courts
applied state wrongful death statutes in these situations.273 In such cases, the
application of the state wrongful death statute is consistent with the federal
maritime interest.
The imposition of a higher standard of care is also consistent with the
265. id at 344.
266. See generally N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, supra note 248, at 152-54. The Admiralty Juris-
diction Extension Act of 1948,46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976), extends admiralty jurisdiction to all cases of
damage or injury to person or property caused by a vessel in navigable waters, notwithstanding
that the damage or injury occurred on land. Absent this provision, if the locus of the tort is placed
where the injury occurs, then admirality jurisdiction does not exist because a maritime locale is a
necessary ingredient of admiralty jurisdiction.
267. 411 U.S. at 343-44.
268. Id at 332-36.
269. Id at 333.
270. See supra note 64.
271. 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
272. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), overruled, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398
U.S. 375 (1970); see also Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974). See generally
Currie, supra note 57, at 186.
273. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
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federal maritime interest. Federal maritime law sets a minimum standard of
care, and generally it is consistent with the purpose of that law to permit a
state to increase the duties established by general maritime law.274 On the
other hand, in no case in the last forty years has the Court permitted the appli-
cation of state law when it impairs the plaintiff's fights under general maritime
law.275 Thus, the Florida Act in Askew, which created strict liability for oil
pollution, could be applied to claims of commercial fishermen and
shellfishermen consistently with Hess and other maritime cases. It would be
inconsistent with Askew and Hess, however, to apply state law when the effect
would be to decrease the protection of the rights of commercial fishermen, as
for example to permit a defendant to assert a defense not cognizable under
maritime law.276 The latter situation has not occurred, and in the decided
cases other than Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation District Commission
277
state law has not been applied when the effect would be to limit the rights of
recovery under maritime law.
B. The Application of State Law to Create Causes of (Action Unrecognized
by Maritime Law is Not Permissible f/It Has an Adverse
Indirect Effect upon Maritime Interests
There also arises the different but closely related problem whether state
law may be applied to create a right of recovery for a maritime tort for a class
of plaintiffs who do not have any compensable interest under general maritime
law. The district court in the continuing litigation in the Kepone case, Pruitt v.
Allied Chemical Corporation,278 has confronted this issue and may have
reached incorrect conclusions. In Pruitt a number of plaintiffs filed an action,
relying on a variety of state law and federal law theories, against Allied Chem-
ical to recover damages they allegedly suffered as the result of the 1976 dump-
ing of the highly toxic chemical Kepone into the James River and Chesapeake
Bay.279 The plaintiffs may be divided into three groups: (1) those that directly
engage in the harvesting of river and bay marine life (commercial fishermen,
shellfishermen, and lessors of oyster beds);280 (2) those that lost profits result-
ing from their inability to sell seafood contaminated by Kepone and from the
274. See, e.g., Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
275. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406, 409-10 (1953); Currie, supra note 57, at 210-11, 219-20; cf. Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
276. See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981). But cf. The Tungus v. Skovgaard,
358 U.S. 588 (1959) (state law of contributory negligence applied in wrongful death case brought
under state law).
277. 557 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1976).
278. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981).
279. Id at 976.
280. In Pruitt the lessors of oyster beds sued a private corporation, not a state governmental
unit. The district court did not mention Moore or dismiss the oyster bed lessor's admiralty claims
on the ground that they were governed by state law and not maritime law. Perhaps claims by
private lessors of oyster beds against private entities that pollute the beds are to be distinguished
from claims against public entities.
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decline in demand for seafood from the affected waters (seafood wholesalers,
retailers, processors, distributors, and restaurateurs); and (3) those that lost
profits because of the decline in sportsfishing on the affected waters (boat,
tackle and bait shop owners, and marina owners). Defendant moved to dis-
miss the claims of all these plaintiffs other than those who directly engaged in
harvesting river and bay marine life. 28t The court granted that motion with
respect to the admiralty claims of the second and third groups, but with re-
spect to the state law claims, only the claims of the second group were dis-
missed. The maritime and state law claims of the second group were
dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs sought recovery for indirect economic
harm not compensable under either state law or maritime law.282 The third
group's state law claims, which also involved claims for indirect economic
harm, were retained, however, on the theory that boat, bait shop, and marina
owners could stand as "surrogate plaintiffs" for recreational fishermen who no
longer were able to use the affected waters.283 But admiralty claims of the
group were dismissed on the ground that, under prevailing maritime princi-
281. 523 F. Supp. at 976.
282. Defendant argued that the first and second groups only suffered indirect harm to their
property or businesses as a result of the Kepone pollution. The court acknowledged that the
general rule is that plaintiffs cannot recover for such indirect economic harm, but since there was
no Virginia law on the subject, see id at 978, the court sought to find a "principled basis" for
distinguishing between the various groups of plaintiffs who relied on the polluted waters for their
livelihood to varying degrees. The commercial fishermen, shellfishermen, and oysterers of the first
group posed no real problem. They made a lawful and direct use of the waters and, according to
the court, had a legally cognizable right to recover damages as a matter of state law. Although the
court did not cite any cases on the right of an individual to recover damages when he suffers a
unique injury as a result of a public nuisance, the cases support the district court's holding with
respect to this first group.
Plaintiffs of the second group were seeking to recover profits lost due to their inability to sell
fish that they purchased or normally would have purchased from plaintiffs of the first group,
These plaintiffs are indistinguishable from a vast number of other potential plaintiffs, including
the employees of these businesses and the people to whom they sell, all of whom may have exper-
ienced some adverse economic impact as a result of the Kepone pollution. The class of potential
plaintiffs, however, is almost infinite. Finding no articulable reason for allowing only some of
these plaintiffs to recover their damages, and faced with the practical need to limit liability, the
court had to draw lines based on its best judgment of equity and efficiency. See id at 980.
283. The claims of the second and third groups could have been treated similarly, but the
court instead decided:
While commercial fishing interests are protected by allowing the fishermen themselves to
recover, it is unlikely that sportfishing interests would be equally protected. Because the
damages each sportsman suffered are likely to be both small and difficult to establish, it
is unlikely that a significant proportion of such fishermen will seek legal redress. Only if
some set of surrogate plaintiffs is entitled to press its own claims which flow from the
damage to the Bay's sportfishing industry will the proper balance of social forces be
preserved. Accordingly, the Court holds that to the extent plaintiffs in. . . [the third
group] suffered losses in sales of goods and services to sportsfishermen as a result of
defendant's tortious behaviour, they have stated a legally cognizable claim.
Id at 980 (footnotes omitted).
One interesting aspect of this holding is that in many jurisdictions, sportsfishermen do not
have a legally cognizable claim for damages when public waters are polluted. W. PROSSER, supra
note 83, at 590, cf Meredith v. Triple Island Gunning Club, 113 Va. 80, 73 S.E. 721 (1912) (plain-
tiff had no claim against defendant who bought an island adjacent to his island in navigable
waters and who shot ducks before they could reach plaintiff's island). Although they may suffer
direct economic injury, the injury suffered is not sufficiently distinguishable from that experienced
by the public at large as a result of the public nuisance. Therefore, it is not compensable in a
public nuisance damage action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979). The district
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ples, recovery of indirect economic loss was not permissible, even if recovery
was sought through the use of a "surrogate plaintiff" theory.
284
Each of the claims presented in Pruitt is a maritime tort within the federal
court's admiralty jurisdiction. Some claims involve commercial activities and
others recreational, but as an earlier discussion indicates, maritime jurisdiction
does not hinge on whether the particular activity is commercial or recrea-
tional.285 In the present situation, the traditional maritime activity is fishing,
and interference with either the recreational or commercial aspects of that ac-
tivity would constitute a maritime tort within admiralty jurisdiction.2 86 The
difference between the two aspects of that traditional maritime activity is not
jurisdictional, but substantive. Maritime law permits commercial fishermen to
recover damages for interference with their activities, but does not permit
recreational fishermen to recover damages. 287 The Court in the Kepone case,
however, implied that sportsfishermen, if they could prove damages, would
have a compensable claim in admiralty, an implication that is incorrect both
as a matter of economic judgment and under principles of the maritime law of
public nuisance. Sportsfishermen may have a sufficient interest to give them
standing to seek an injunction to prevent or stop activities that interfere with
the fishing, but this fact alone does not imply that the interest is one for which
compensation may be received.
The maritime law distinction between the right of commercial fishermen
and shellfishermen to recover their provable economic losses and the denial of
any right of recovery to recreational fishermen and shellfishermen for the in-
terference with their fishing activities or the loss of the use of navigable waters
is a reasonable one. The commercial fishing industry is an important source of
jobs and food. Destruction of fisheries by pollution thus means both a loss of
a valuable food supply and of livelihoods.288 By contrast, a recreational
fisherman experiences no economic loss. His ability to feed and clothe himself
or his family is not affected; only a form of relaxation and pleasure is lost. The
crucial question is whether that loss is one that should be individually
compensable.
court's decision permits plaintiffs of the third group to act as "surrogate plaintiffs" for a class of
people that have no independent legally cognizable right to recover damages.
284. When the court turned to the admiralty claims, the case took another interesting twist.
Relying upon Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), and Venore Transp.
Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978), the district court held that neither the second
nor third groups were entitled to recover damages under admiralty law. These claims sought
recovery of indirect economic damages and were therefore not cognizable under prevailing admi-
ralty principles. Additionally, the "surrogate plaintiff' approach followed for the state law claims
of the third group could not be applied in maritime law. 523 F. Supp. at 982. The decision might
be summarized as permitting the third group: (1) to recover damages as surrogate plaintiffs under
state law when under both state and admiralty law the persons for whom they are surrogates have
no right to recover damages, and (2) to recover on state law principles when maritime law would
bar any recovery.
285. See Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981); supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 96-99 & 101-02 and accompanying text.
288. E.g., Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-
1882 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-127 to -316 (1978 & Cum. Supp. 1981).
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Little justification exists for such compensation. The loss is difficult to
measure in monetary terms. Also, the courts themselves are publically subsi-
dized, and use of limited court time to determine such issues hardly seems to
be a sensible use of a limited resource. Finally, there is always the question of
how much of the damage that follows from any tortfeasor's activities the
tortfeasor will actually be compelled to pay. Unless it is permissible to bank-
rupt industries that cause substantial environmental damage, limitations must
exist.28 9 Even pollution-causing industrial activities employ people and are
part of the economic environment, and most of the people they employ will be
free of any fault for the pollution that occurs. Yet, imposition of all environ-
mental cost upon the company responsible for the damage may result in the
loss ofjobs for its employees, whose only fault is association with the polluter.
The ripple economic effect of this loss of jobs as the result of expansive liabil-
ity for environmental damages should not be overlooked. As between the po-
tential economic health of the company and its employees and the intangible
losses experienced by the recreational fishermen, the equities clearly favor the
company and its employees.
In the Kepone case the plaintiffs in the third group are not the sports-
fishermen themselves, but those who sell fishing and boating supplies to
sportsfishermen. The gist of this group's claim is that the pollution constituted
a tortious interference with the maritime contractual relationships that existed
between them and sportfishermen. Although the district court, by using a
"surrogate plaintiff" theory, permitted the third group to remain in the case as
plaintiffs on the state law claims, it held that the Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Fint2 9° decision precluded any right of recovery in admiralty on either a
surrogate plaintiff theory or on a theory of interference with contract. In Rob-
ins, the plaintiff, a time charterer, was not permitted to recover damages for
loss of the use of the vessel when it was damaged while in dry dock.29 ' Under
the terms of the charter, the owner was not liable for the loss of use, so the
charterer sued the dry dock. The court held that maritime law did not permit
recovery by a person who suffers economic injury as the result of an uninten-
tional tort committed by a third party against those with whom the plaintiff
was doing business. 292 Robins has been extended beyond its facts to encom-
pass the general idea that those who suffer indirect economic maritime losses
will not be permitted to recover the damages they experience. 293 This basic
idea caused dismissal of the state law claims of the plaintiffs in the second
289. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(l)-(3) (Supp.
IV 1980); Atomic Energy Damages (Price-Anderson) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
290. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
291. Id at 307.
292. Id at 309.
293. See Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978). In Marine Navig.
Sulpher Carriers, Inc. v. Lone State Indus., 638 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1981), aj'g In re Marine Navig.
Sulpher Carriers, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Va. 1980) the court observed that the rule devel-
oped by the First and Ninth Circuits, permitting recovery for economic losses suffered by clam
diggers and commercial fishermen because of oil spill injury to aquatic life, was a "special and
narrow one," conceivably "at odds with" the general rule. Id at 702.
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group, and the specific holding of Robins resulted in the dismissal of the admi-
ralty claims. The occupations of the plaintiffs in the third group and the legal
theories underlying their claims do not change the role of the federal courts in
deciding whether to permit recovery. The claims are maritime and the deter-
mination whether damages may be recovered is one for the federal courts to
make.2 9 4 Concurrent application of state law to permit the recovery barred by
maritime law could only be justified if the state interest in compensating plain-
tiffs of that group outweighs the federal maritime interest in denying
compensation.
295
The state interest in pollution cases is threefold. First, it may have a gen-
eral interest in the health and safety of its citizens. Second, it has an interest in
compensating its citizens who are injured as a result of pollution. Third, it
may be interested in limiting liability to protect a particular pollutor or class of
pollutors despite the fact that others are injured. The state's interest in health
and safety is adequately protected by the permit system of the FWPCA and
the power of the state pursuant to the FWPCA to impose stricter water quality
standards and effluent limitations than exist under EPA regulations. 296 Any
state interest in protecting water pollutors from liability would be contrary to
both the congressional intent underlying the FWPCA297 and, when it would
bar recovery by maritime interests, to the line of cases not permitting state law
to be applied if it would result in a decrease in the protection of maritime
interests.298 Finally, when the state's interest in compensating plaintiffs of
group three is weighed against the effect that compensation would have upon
the rights of commerical fishermen under maritime law, application of state
law is improper. The effect of the "surrogate plaintiff' approach, however
laudable the district court's motives, is the dilution of the possibility of actual
recovery by those entitled to recover under maritime law. With only a finite
amount of assets available to judgment creditors and the tremendous potential
ripple economic effects of pollution activity, the larger the class of potential
judgment creditors, the greater the likelihood that the maritime plaintiffs'
claims will not be satisfied out of available assets.
Maritime law has protected maritime interests not only by special rules of
substantive law but also by rules that give maritime creditors priority to assets
294. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co.; 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). As Professors Gilmore and Black have said, "If
there is any sense at all in making maritime law a federal subject, then there must be some limit
set to the power of the states to interfere in the field of its working." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 21, at 48. Professor Redish takes the view that "[i]n the absence of applicable congres-
sional legislation, a federal court should in every case choose to apply state law, instead of creating
its own maritime common law." M. REDISH, supra note 29, at 99. Nonetheless, he does concede
that "[t]he federal courts have not hesitated to create and apply federal maritime common law,"
and that "this suggestion deviates dramatically from the current state of the law." Id at 99, 105.
295. See supra note 290.
296. See, e.g., Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 319 n.14, 327 & n.20; EPA v. California ex
rel State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 218 (1976); Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest
Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
297. American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
298. See supra notes 259-70 and accompanying text.
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in some situations.299 Many maritime claims, especially tort claims, result in
maritime liens when a vessel is responsible for the injury. Those liens give the
maritime claimant priority over all nonmaritime claimants. 300 Thus, if a ves-
sel were the source of pollution, commercial fishermen would have a claim to
the vessel superior to the claims of nonmaritime interests.30' When the source
of pollution is not a vessel and when no maritime lien would exist, Robins may
be viewed as a decision that operates to assure the distribution of available
assets in a manner consistent with the policies underlying maritime law. By
disallowing the recovery of indirect economic losses, Robins conserves the
available assets for those maritime interests whose losses are more immediate.
Applying state law, when the effect would be the possible dilution of the pro-
tection of maritime interests, would both conflict with Robins and be imper-
missible under article III.
This conclusion does not always give an absolute priority to maritime
claimants. When Executive Jet302 changed the standards for determining ad-
miralty jurisdiction, it also complicated the analysis of problems such as
these.303 If a land based polluter causes both maritime and nonmaritime inju-
ries, for example, to fishermen and people who use the water in land based
activities, maritime law will only govern the maritime injuries, and state law
the nonmaritime claims. 3°4 That result, however, is a product of the more
complicated test of admiralty jurisdiction and the nature of a federal system in
which some activities will inevitably cause injuries governed by state and fed-
eral law. This situation, however, is distinguishable from the one in Pruitt,
because in Pruitt the plaintiffs in the third group had in their own right only a
claim for interference with maritime contracts, a claim that would be governed
by maritime law. Any other claim would not involve any distinct injury to
them, but merely one that flowed from the maritime injury to sportsfishermen,
for which no recovery is permissible under maritime law. Thus, Pruitt is not a
case of both maritime and nonmaritime claims. Pruitt is simply a case requir-
ing a determination of which maritime claims are compensable, a decision that
is for the federal courts to make, applying traditional maritime principles.
CONCLUSION
Although the United States Supreme Court has never held that com-
299. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 586-89, 622-33, 733-42.
300. Id at 622.
301. California v. S.S. Bornemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
302. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
303. The Supreme Court has not expressly held that the Executive Jet test applies to all mari-
time torts. The Court in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2658 (1982) stated that
the "Executive Jet requirement that the wrong have a significant connection with traditional mari-
time activity is not limited to the aviation context."
304. This is assuming no federal statute applies to the nonmaritime claims and no other basis
exists for the application of federal law. State law must apply in the absence of any basis for the
application of federal law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The State of Illinois' claim in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) was not a
maritime claim because the state did not assert that Milwaukee's conduct interfered with any of
the traditional maritime activities of the state.
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mercial fishermen have a right under general maritime law to recover damages
when fisheries in territorial waters are destroyed by pollution, a strong argu-
ment can be made that such a right exists, thereby giving commercial
fishermen both access to the federal courts and a uniform minimum level of
protection. This right has not been supplanted by the FWPCA, as was the
federal common law of water pollution, or by any other act of Congress. State
law may be applied only when the effect of the state law would be to provide
commerical fishermen even greater protection against the consequences of pol-
lution damage than does present general maritime law. Finally, the states may
not create a cause of action for maritime torts for which general maritime law
does not recognize a right to recover when the effect of such state law would be
to diminish indirectly the protection afforded commercial fishermen under
general maritime law. The determination of which groups are entitled to re-
cover damages as the result of a maritime pollution tort is one to be made by
the federal courts after weighing the consequences in light of federal maritime
interests.

